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that WHOSOEVER shall
CALL on the name of the
LORD shall be delivered."

(Joel ii. 32.)

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Sometimes the addition or deletion of a single word involves the resetting of a whole paragraph and thus causes much unnecessary cost and delay.

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THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW
FEBRUARY, 1953

**RUSSIA AND THE NEUTRAL WORLD
IN ASIA**

THE American Presidential election is over and it is possible for United States diplomacy to act once more with a greater sense of assurance. The political paralysis which takes place for some six months every four years in the United States is one of the facts that international diplomacy has to take into account. But the change of personalities in the White House is not necessarily going to bring peace any nearer or make more tractable the problem of the prisoners of war on which all armistice negotiations up to date have foundered. Last November Vyshinsky created the impression that his counterproposals contained an element of hope: an armistice might be concluded and the prisoner of war question might be shelved for a while and handed over to a commission of eleven nations on which apparently Russia would be in a minority. There seemed something here which might form a basis of further discussion. But on the other hand there was the danger that the Western Allies might get an armistice by shelving the prisoner question and in the meantime give the Russians the opportunity for endless delay and obstruction.

On this matter of the prisoners the Allies cannot give way. Quite apart from the moral aspect of the question one has to face the fact that we are up against a new type of undeclared war and that the Geneva Convention requires modification to deal with it. For the Convention was drawn up on the assumption that, when nations fight, their citizens are united in their respective national causes and that mass desertion is unknown. But the kind of war in Korea and the war in Indo-China and Malaya are in part at least civil wars in which classes, races and internal factions fight each other with foreign aid. If hot war on a large scale broke out in the world today, in which Russia was involved, that war would take this form. One of the weapons for fighting that war would be to call on the enemy soldiers to surrender and desert. Obviously those who do surrender could not be given up at an armistice without making this kind of warfare impossible. The Russians of course stand by the Geneva Convention and claim the return of all prisoners taken from them, in order to make desertion in future impossible. Yet they have the supreme insolence to throw over the principles of the Geneva Convention when it suits their purpose. They still hold thousands of German prisoners of war whom they apparently have no intention of releasing. When you are dealing with people who have no sense of human rights and who consider only rights of classes and party ideologies, you have to use quite different methods to those in hitherto conventional wars when making armistice or peace treaties.

In this connection one most important development has recently taken place. India has for some time been trying to play the role of impartial and neutral mediator between the West and the Russo-Chinese block. It has naturally been somewhat galling for us to see Asiatic countries, who might themselves at some future time become the victims of Communist aggression, pose as arbitrators as if both sides were equally at fault. But one has to remember that South Asia and parts of the Middle East have only recently become independent of European tutelage and, although the mere fact of the voluntary withdrawal of the European Powers proves that their colonial system was sufficiently liberal to be superior to that of the Communist Powers, it is nevertheless true that the new states in Asia do not see it in this light. They are still suffering from delayed reaction from the period of tutelage and see dangers where none exist. But it seems that they are beginning to see that the West is not the danger they thought it was.

There can be no doubt that the Indian proposals at the United Nations General Assembly received the support of most of the world outside the Iron Curtain. Very wisely Mr. Eden jumped at the opportunity of securing the moral support of India by giving in his turn moral support to India's proposals. The Indians are far too humane to stand for the inhuman proposals of the Russians, although the modifications which they put forward roused the suspicions of the United States. Yet their peremptory rejection by Vyshinsky at the General Assembly can only have caused a general lowering of the moral prestige of Russia throughout the world and especially in India and Southern Asia. The reaction to the Russian rejection has been widespread and has even affected the delegates to the recent Vienna Peace Conference. Here pacifists and various forms of fellow-travellers gathered together under Russian auspices, but for the first time serious protests were heard at the peremptory rejection of the Indian offer. In other words recent developments over Korea have resulted in some break in the ice of neutrality which has up to now frozen the outlook of the independent countries of Southern Asia.

I have written up to now as if Russia was the sole deciding force in the Korean war, but the fact is that China does not always jump on to the Russian bandwagon. There are circumstances which might at any time make for increasing Chinese independence of Russia. In such matters as trade and economic exchange Russia has given China little and has asked hard terms for anything of value delivered. Russia retains her hold over Manchuria and Port Arthur. China in return does not venerate Stalin as the great teacher, does not genuflect appropriately when the name of Russian saints are mentioned but prefers her own Chinese Communist heroes. It is clear therefore that the tactics of the West should be to widen the gap as much as possible, just as Russia tries to exploit any difference that may arise between the U.S.A. and other Western nations. Up to now the West has completely failed in this respect. Indeed some of its actions in the political field has tended to strengthen the Russo-Chinese tie in face of common danger. There has been for some time an incipient fear that the policy associated with General MacArthur might get control of American policy, in spite of President Truman's courageous action last year. So long as that fear

persists China will be driven into Russia's arms. A wise policy in the Far East should aim at detaching China from Russia. At the moment there does not seem much chance of this, but at least we can avoid action which would drive them further together.

For the fact is that the prisoner of war issue is not the sole factor which is preventing an armistice. That matter would be settled at once if China thought that no further good would come from a continuance of the war. But at the present moment it seems likely that both Russia and China hold the view that on balance it will advance the world revolution to tie up Allied troops in Korea and so prevent them from being concentrated in other weak spots of South East Asia, like Indo-China. At the moment it does not seem that the economic difficulties caused to China by the war in Korea outweigh the political advantages of creating trouble for the West in weak spots. It looks as if the West will have to accept this situation for a while longer but to prepare for a time when skilful diplomacy might have some effect on the possibilities of detaching China. Nothing is gained by weakness in dealing with Communists. Only if the West stands firm, even at the cost of some sacrifice, will results come in the end. There must be economic pressure inside China as a result of the Korean war which must be delaying internal developments on which the Chinese Communists are bent. If then the Allies do nothing to force China into Russian arms by threatening general war or expeditions from Formosa, the chance of encouraging China to run an independent policy are much greater. It may be regarded as reasonably certain that China is much concerned with her prestige in Asia, and she is likely to be less keen on Russia's prestige in Europe. Therefore she is not likely to be as interested as Russia in tying down Allied forces in the East in order to make possible Communist advances in Europe. She is more concerned with Indo-China and Russia with Europe. It is to exploit such a situation as this that our diplomacy ought to be working.

We may have to go some while before we can see results of this policy and meanwhile things may get worse rather than better in the spots of South East Asia which China is counting to exploit against us. This is particularly true of Indo-China. Here it seems that the new American President is already giving the matter his attention. From the point of view of resisting Communist aggression in Asia, Indo-China is as important as Korea. In a sense it is more so because its loss to the free world would strategically endanger Siam, Burma and even Malaya. As is generally the case in this cold war and the local hot wars, Communism cannot be fought successfully by military measures alone. The independence which the French have conceded to the Emperor Bao Dai is a restricted one. Some restriction of course is unavoidable as long as the war continues, for the French military authorities must have emergency powers. Yet one would like to see in those parts of Indo-China which are far removed from military operations some gesture that Indo-Chinese independence is real. French colonial tradition is different from ours, not necessarily less sound but certainly awkward for meeting a situation like the present one in South East Asia.

As far as the military situation is concerned the stale-mate that seems to exist in Indo-China can only be broken by some accession of strength

to the French Viet-Nam forces. Direct American and British contributions in armed forces cannot be sent because the Chinese would almost certainly reply by similar contributions to Viet-Minh. But considerably increased war supplies could be sent by both the United States and Britain which would tilt the scales in favour of Viet-Nam. It is doubtful if China could reply so easily to this form of assistance. But to make this aid effective there will probably be needed in Indo-China some increase of the French forces there. Not only is this unlikely to be forthcoming but on the contrary it looks as if a French government in the near future will try to reduce the French forces already in Indo-China. For the financial problem in France remains unsolved, and increased American assistance to France in some form or another seems inevitable. On the other hand Congress will certainly need some proof that France is willing to carry on the struggle in this vital area in Asia. The key to the Indo-China situation seems to lie in the Franco-American discussion that must shortly take place. This will involve the whole complex issue of the European Defence Community. France in a word does not want to get so involved in South East Asia that her military centre of gravity is shifted too much away from Europe, where the ever-present fear of German domination of E.D.C. haunts all French governments. France will bargain hard with the Americans and will require considerable inducements to send further forces to Indo-China or even to keep her existing forces there. This is the dilemma that faces the West, but it must be solved if Communism is to be checked in Asia.

In another part of the world, the Middle East, the West and Communism are also competing for the support of Asiatic people, who maintain neutrality in the cold war and nurse grievances mainly against the West. The fanatical Nationalist regime in Persia still continues in power, relying on the Teheran mob to terrorise opposition. But it would be a mistake to belittle its authority. Dr. Mossadeq probably has the majority of articulate Persian opinion behind him and the tacit consent of the inarticulate and poverty-stricken peasantry. He is playing the time-honoured Persian game of blackmailing alternately Russia and the West in order to get concessions from both. The Persians have been at this game for the best part of a century, but this time America replaces Britain as an object of blackmail. The Persians know that the Americans are more frightened of the threat of Communism in the East than we are, but the Americans also see that to submit to Persian blackmail would only jeopardise their oil agreements with the Arab states and make impossible the future of financial aid from the West for development in the countries of the Middle East. The Persians have remarkable powers of national resistance and there is no evidence as yet that Communist infiltrations into the Persian army have taken place sufficiently to make the Russians think that the time has come to make a move in, say Persian Azerbaijan.

In the Arab countries there is no sign that they want to co-operate with the West in building up an East Mediterranean and Middle East mutual defence scheme. Bitterness against Israel is as strong as ever, and Britain and the United States are held responsible for the wrong done to the Arab world. The 800,000 Arab refugees from Palestine are a constant reminder of that wrong. No compromise is sought with Israel and the

impossible demand for the return of these refugees to Palestine is insisted on. Nevertheless steps have been taken to allow some of these refugees to be settled in Syria which indicates a faint ray of realism in Arab policy.

It seems inevitable that for a time at least plans for the defence of this part of the world against possible Russian aggression must be based not on the Suez Canal and Arab airfields but on Cyprus and Turkey. There is a good deal to be said for this solution anyhow temporarily, but it will mean the construction of certain harbours and the improvement of others. The future of the Suez Canal Defence Zone is still undecided and is dependent on the Sudan discussion between Britain and Egypt. The difficulty here is the Southern Sudan, inhabited by primitive people of quite different origin and culture to that of the Northern Sudan and Egypt. It seems now that General Neguib has brought off an agreement with the Sudanese including the parties representing the South. If this is so the sooner we come to agreement with both the better. The army rule in Egypt has done good work in cleaning up the Augean stables left by the Wafd. But the soldiers are hardly equal to the task of social and economic reconstruction that is so badly needed in Egypt, and it looks as if General Neguib is going to have to use some of the politicians of the discredited parties who happen to be experts in their subjects. It remains to be seen if the army can prevent the corrupt elements from creeping back and if the latter will gradually force General Neguib to take an anti-British line once more. Already there are disturbing signs that this is beginning to take place. The General is in a difficult position and he has to consider public opinion, but he has at least succeeded in keeping the Cairo and Alexandria mobs under control.

If the Arab world shows few signs of leaving its policy of neutralism in the cold war between Russia and the West, there are definite signs of improvement in the internal affairs of these countries. For years parliamentary institutions in the Arab world have been clogged with corruption. The people have been too long under foreign rule and are, with the exception of Syria, too illiterate to have an educated electorate. Military governments are unpopular with us and with the Americans, but there are occasions when there is no alternative and that situation has been reached in many Arab countries. One must hope that the fine example of Turkey which has passed out of a reforming dictatorship to a full parliamentary regime will be followed in the Arab world.

M. PHILIPS PRICE.

SWITZERLAND: PROSPEROUS BUT WORRIED

WHO could have thought that at a time when Great Britain—under Mr. Churchill's leadership—is constrained for economic reasons to reduce her rearmament efforts, while the other West European democracies belonging to N.A.T.O. have to be constantly prodded, urged and helped by America to get on with their defence programme, little Switzerland, of all nations, should be the only country this side of the iron curtain which is fully ready for any emergency?

When General Marshall told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee nearly two years ago that the United States was planning to have 400,000 men in Europe by the end of 1952, this figure struck some of the experts as excessively large and hard to reach. Yet permanently neutral Switzerland, with a population thirty-three times smaller than that of the U.S.A., can put into the field considerably more than 400,000 men at any time, and at the shortest of notice. What is more, these Swiss soldiers are properly trained, well equipped, and fully instructed as to where they are to go and what they are to do. There were periods during the last war when Switzerland had as many as 800,000 men under arms, ready to repel any attack. Thanks to compulsory military service and subsequent regular refresher courses for all healthy males between twenty and sixty years of age, Switzerland has a defence force of remarkable strength. But its purpose is purely protective.

Switzerland's neutrality does not signify disarmament or defeatism. On the contrary, it is an armed neutrality, and the nation—which has a great military tradition which goes back for centuries—is willing at all times to defend the inviolability of its territory. From early childhood every citizen is trained in the faith that national independence is worth fighting for and dying for. Between periods of service he keeps his uniform, gun, and ammunition at home, and, if he happens to be a cavalryman, even his horse, in which he and the State have a joint interest. Thus the State and the citizens are partners in national defence—not master and servant.

During the second World War they blasted into the rocks of Central Switzerland their famous "National Redoubt," and were ready to conduct a prolonged defensive fight from this formidable citadel. They mined the mountain passes, tunnels, roads and bridges, with the intention of blowing them up to prevent potential invaders from passing. Thus it can be said that they mobilised nature itself to the defence of their country and that the whole nation was armed to the last cow.

Present-day rearmament requirements naturally raise a host of new problems. A six-years' programme costing 1,464 million francs has been adopted, or, in round figures, 1,500 millions in six annual instalments of 250 millions each—in addition to the normal military budgets. There has been a considerable amount of disagreement on the best ways of financing these huge national defence expenses, but not on their need or their volume. The Socialists put forward a scheme for a capital levy. But this was rejected by the nation, when 422,255 citizens voted against it and 328,341 expressed themselves in favour of the plan. This was in May, 1952. In July the Federal Government submitted to the popular vote a detailed scheme for raising the necessary funds by means of certain additional taxes. But this was likewise rejected by 352,205 votes against 256,035. The majority of the nation seems to feel that, at any rate for the time being, the State has enough money in its coffers to carry out the rearmament programme without imposing any additional taxation. But no doubt the Federal Government will have to submit some new legislative proposals in the course of 1953.

While they refuse to be rushed into any important decisions, and invariably take a very long time to brood over any piece of legislation

directly affecting them, the people of Switzerland do recognise the value of making wise provision for the future. Characteristically enough, the Swiss Government began preparing for the Second World War as early as 1934, or five years before the actual outbreak of hostilities. In April, 1938—several months before Munich—a law was passed increasing the Government's powers for emergency stock-piling and various other wartime necessities. While Chamberlain was babbling about "peace in our time," the cautious Swiss were preparing for the double eventuality of a blockade and also that of having to defend themselves.

The law of 1938 was still in force when ten years later they again decided to start on a wartime emergency programme. In the person of Mr. Otto Zipfel they have in Switzerland a very able economic expert whose official title is "Delegate for the Creation of Employment." But since Switzerland has been enjoying full employment for many years now, the standing joke about this excellent public servant has always been that he is "the only unemployed in the country." Ever since 1948, however, he has been extremely busy behind the scenes setting up the necessary shadow organisation for a possible war economy, and in taking various preliminary steps to be ready in case of emergency. He has now the additional title of "Delegate for War Economy," and with a small staff of half a dozen assistants, working in an office of only four or five rooms, he is conducting his important operations, which include the stock-piling of foodstuffs and the gradual building up of extra stocks of raw materials for industry. A huge programme for the construction of silos and storage space of all kinds has been set in motion, including substantial installations for oil storage, which are being built into the mountains themselves. The tonnage of Switzerland's small merchant marine has been increased by purchase or charter. Various measures for the re-orientation of industrial production and commerce to a wartime economy have been carefully worked out, being under constant review and revision in accordance with changing circumstances. Meanwhile, however, industry and commerce are encouraged to pursue their normal peace-time activities.

At this point it becomes essential to recall a few fundamental facts which Switzerland's apparent prosperity and stability tend to obscure. A small land-locked country with a population of 4.7 million, she has no raw materials, no overseas possessions, and about one-quarter of her territory is completely barren, while the remaining three-quarters of the mountainous regions offer only limited scope for agriculture or other productive exploitation. But the Swiss have known how to turn these physical disadvantages of their country into assets. Switzerland's scenic beauty has been made the very foundation of a world-wide tourist industry. This is no longer as remunerative as in the golden era preceding the First World War, but it still makes a vital direct and indirect contribution to national revenue as well as to the balance of payments. The central position of their little territory has enabled them to make it the crossroads between Eastern and Western, or Central and Southern Europe—especially between Germany and Italy—despite the geographical obstacles to traffic. In recent years Switzerland has also become a vital link in international civil aviation. The big modern airfields of Zurich

and Geneva are handling a constantly growing volume of passenger and goods traffic. "Swissair," in which the Confederation, the Cantons, and a number of private shareholders are jointly interested, now operates in nineteen countries. In addition to that, eighteen countries are linked with Switzerland through aviation companies of their own. The importance of "Swissair" is particularly great to the Swiss, since it is the only means of transportation owned and operated by themselves which directly connects their country—an inland island, as it were—with the rest of the world. After some financial setbacks, mainly caused by the devaluation of European currencies in 1949, "Swissair" rapidly regained its self-confidence and is now growing from strength to strength.

Transit trade (by train, road, barge, steamer, and now also by air) and tourism, in their turn, have led to the creation of a wide range of other commercial, financial and industrial activities, while the powerful mountain streams and waterfalls have been harnessed to produce a constantly growing and almost inexhaustible supply of electric power. This "white coal" is invaluable not only for industry, but also for the Federal railways, all the main lines of which are now electrified. Despite the importance of agriculture, food production can only satisfy one-third of the nation's minimum annual requirements. In order to feed herself and keep her industries going, Switzerland is therefore to a very large degree dependent on international trade—both as a source of supplies and an outlet for the goods she manufactures.

Thus, quite apart from the danger of war, the Swiss have plenty of problems and worries, some of which are genuine and some of which are vastly exaggerated. They are not a happy people by nature, and so much of their time and energy is absorbed by exceedingly hard work that they have largely forgotten how to enjoy life. Immensely diligent, efficient and frugal, they let their minds dwell on troubles of every conceivable variety, rather than derive satisfaction from any achievements—which are numerous indeed. Having spent the last three years in worrying about the decline of business conditions and an approaching crisis, they have discovered time after time that these have been excellent years after all; 1951 was actually a record year when their exports and imports achieved unprecedented figures in both value and volume. The first three-quarters of 1952 seem to indicate that, without necessarily being equal to 1951, it will be an exceptionally good year too.

Sensitive as she is to market conditions abroad, Switzerland is particularly concerned about international economic trends in good and bad times alike. Much more than mere monetary consideration is involved. Because the quality of goods produced by her industry, or the nature of her tourist trade is of the highest order, and because the Swiss nation is accustomed to high wages and considerable profits, the prices charged for everything are high too. So, when cheaper goods appear anywhere, or other countries make a bid for attracting foreign tourists, the Swiss get worried. For they know that if they are to maintain their competitive position, they must find a way of lowering costs and prices, and no country likes to lower its standard of living. But there is also danger to Switzerland when times are too good, or when boom conditions threaten a re-emergence of the famous price-wage spiral. Wage and price control

is as distasteful in times of plenty as the lowering of the standard of living in times of recession. But when either of these measures becomes a national necessity, there is little room left for argument.

To the extent to which they can regulate or adjust their economic life by decisions or efforts or sacrifices of their own, the Swiss have no cause to doubt that they are able to overcome any obstacle. Their whole history proves that. But what makes them so worried now is the knowledge that, despite continuing prosperity, their economic future is precariously dependent on a whole series of outside factors which are completely beyond their control. As to the political dangers, their willingness at all times to defend their small country turns them into a factor to be reckoned with even by the boldest of strategists and would-be conquerors. Napoleon's famous dictum about Switzerland that "no wise man would attempt to conquer it" is true enough. But the trouble is that nowadays there are so few wise men. In fact, the Swiss are firmly convinced that outside their own country there are not any at all, and maybe they are not far wrong.

GEORGE SOLOVEYTCHIK.

THE JEWISH REMNANT IN GERMANY

WHEN the State of Israel was created in May, 1948, there were in Germany nearly two hundred thousand Jews, mostly in Displaced Persons' camps. Only a small part were the tiny remnant of German Jewry which had survived Hitler's campaign of extermination. The rest were Jews torn by the Nazis from their homes in Eastern and Western Europe. Four years later the number of Jews in Germany is estimated at twenty-one thousand. About half are the survivors of German Jewry, what is left of that community of half a million which played an important part in the economic, social and cultural life of Germany before Hitler. Many are half-Jews, the children of mixed marriages, or having contracted a marriage with a non-Jew. The other half are the remnant of the displaced mass from Eastern Europe and the Baltic region who did not emigrate, when they had the opportunity, to Israel or the U.S.A., or other countries overseas. They have found a temporary home in the German cities, are no longer counted as refugees, and have entered into the economic life. For most of the other displaced persons who were in the German camps in 1948, the initials D.P. meant Destination Palestine. And they have arrived.

The Jews are distributed as follows between the four Zones of Germany and the political island of Berlin, with its four sectors. Roughly one-third are in Berlin, and of those seven thousand, about two thousand live in the Eastern or Russian sector. Over one-third are in the American Zone. Two thousand of these are living in the last remaining Jewish displaced persons' camp at Foehrenwald, near Munich. The rest of the 21,000 are divided between the British, the French, and the Russian Zones. The number in each of the last two Zones is estimated at 500. Russian sources, however, give a considerably larger number of Jews in their region. Some authorities say that it is 5,000, and not 500, and it is certain that the Russians have rebuilt or restored the big synagogues

in the chief towns of their region, Dresden, Leipzig, etc. After Berlin, the principal centres of the reduced Jewish population are, in the American Zone, Frankfort and Munich; in the British Zone, Hamburg, Duesseldorf and Hanover. Each of these towns has a community of over 1,000. The Jewish communities are well organised in each Zone, and also in Berlin. A representative body is elected by the few thousand members to be the Central Council of the Jews in North-Western or Southern Germany, as the case may be. They are careful to insist that it is not a Council of German Jews. That a Central Council for Berlin, preserving the unity of the "Gemeinde" in the capital should have survived the atomic fission which has split the general population of the four Sectors, is a remarkable tribute to Jewish solidarity. The two leading rabbis of Berlin, the Liberal, who was brought from America, and the Conservative, who held rabbinical office in the city before the Hitler régime, minister to the Jews in all Sectors.

The chief communal institutions indeed are in the Eastern Sector of Berlin, which contained the principal Jewish quarters in the old days. The old "Gemeinde" office in the Oranienburg Strasse is again in use, as is the main cemetery, with its 120,000 graves dating from 1880. Walking down the paths of the cemetery, you see the memorials of the great rabbis, philosophers, scholars, and philanthropists of the last two generations of German Jews. More recent is a tablet erected to the memory of those young men who fell in the fight against Hitler. The graves of those who have died in Berlin since the end of the war are well-tended, and lovely with flowers. In the Eastern Sector, also, are the shops of two Jewish *kosher* butchers, which attract buyers from the Western areas because, owing to the difference of the Eastern and Western mark, prices in that Sector are much lower.

It is one of the sad aspects of Jewish life in Germany today that it looks backwards, to memories of the past and to recovery of what was taken by Nazi brutality. Anniversaries, most of them tragic, are multiplied. And a main interest of the leaders and of the rank and file is the procedure for obtaining restitution of immovable property that belonged to Jewish owners, and compensation from the Central and local authorities for the loss of life, liberty and health, the confiscation of movable property, and the spoliatory taxation imposed on Jews who were forced to leave Germany. They write and talk about these matters without end. The negotiations between Israel and the Jewish Claims Conference on the one side, and the German Federal Government on the other, which ended in the agreement signed at Luxembourg in September, were closely followed, and were fully reported in the well-edited Jewish weekly, *Allgemeine*—produced in Dusseldorf—which circulates in the three Zones. The interest is again concentrated on the claims of individuals before German Tribunals for Restitution and Compensation, and on the action of the Jewish Successor Organisations which have been established to claim heirless property whose owner was killed, or died, without leaving heirs, and to apply it for the benefit of the community. At the same time, the Jews in Germany are deeply concerned about signs of recurrent anti-Semitism in the country. The prosecution and the long-drawn trial of Philipp Auerbach, a Jewish survivor of the concentration camps, who

had been the head of the Restitution office in Bavaria, and was charged with malpractice, and finally, having been convicted on some minor charges, took his own life, seemed to the Jewish public another Dreyfus Affaire.

Considerable progress has been made during the last years with the business of individual restitution and compensation, though the German machinery, like most legal machines, is slow. In the American Zone, where the law and the tribunals have been in operation for four years, the amount recovered is substantial. The value is over 800,000,000 Deutsche Marks (£65,000,000). The total covers as well claims of non-Jews; but the greater part of the claimants are Jewish. The Successor Organisation in the American Zone has contrived to make global settlements with each of the German "Lands" (Provinces) in the Zone, and, in return for the assignment to the local government of the claims against individual restitutors, to obtain a lump sum payment from the government. In the British Zone, the progress is considerably less, in regard to the claims both of individuals and of the Successor Organisations. The restitution law was not enacted by the British authority, and the Restitution Agencies and Courts were not established till the latter part of 1949. The amount recovered ultimately should not be smaller than in the American Zone. In Berlin the progress hitherto has been slowest, because Allied Control is weak.

Claims for compensation for personal injury made on behalf of Jewish sufferers, whether resident or not resident in Germany, have not yet been satisfied in any large measure. The law is still incomplete—and in the British Zone hardly exists—and the procedure started much later. Hitherto moreover, the Federal German Government has not accepted liability for claims against the former Reich on account of the confiscation of movable property and the iniquitous taxation against Jews. The Contractual Agreements between the Western Allies and the Federal Government place that burden squarely on the Federal Government. The hope is that, when those Agreements are ratified, a general compensation law will be enacted by the Federal Government for all Zones.

When the restitution and compensation action has been completed, the bulk of the Jews in Germany should be materially independent; and for those who are too old or too ill to work, it should be possible for the communities to provide homes and maintenance from the communal property recovered. In Berlin the proportion of the population which has to be supported in this way today is 40 per cent., and probably it is much the same elsewhere. The will to make not only material reparation, but also moral atonement, for the sins committed against the Jews by Hitler and the Nazis is sincere in some of the officials of the restitution and compensation offices. They struggle with legal tangles; and men like Professor Boehm and Dr. Kuster, who were the first representatives of the German Government in the negotiations with Israel and with the Jewish Conference, made it manifest that they were concerned to secure a just settlement. Dr. Kuster, indeed, disregarded the conventions of the Civil Service by denouncing openly in a broadcast, at a critical stage of the negotiations, the attitude of his own Government towards the Jewish claim. A symbolic action, which came to the writer's notice in

Berlin, was that the Director of the Restitution Office organises a monthly collection amongst his staff to send food parcels to Israel. Another symbolic action is that in some churches of the Lutheran community a collection is made for an Olive Tree Fund for Israel.

Nazi Anti-Semitism has raised again its ugly head in the Neo-Nazi parties. On the other hand, leaders of the churches and leading laymen have come out forthrightly against it. There is, too, the movement of "Peace with Israel," headed by Senator Luth of Hamburg, and by a noble-hearted Lutheran pastor, Dr. Maas, of Heidelberg, who saved thousands of Jews from the Hitler tyranny, and who was the honoured guest of the Israel Government in 1950. When the restitution and compensation issues are settled, what will be the structure of the Jewish community in Germany? It will include a large number of old persons who have to be supported by the communal funds. It will include also a large number who are employees of the community, minding cemeteries and records. Jews, however, are prominent again, in relation to their numbers, in political and judicial offices, and in the legal and medical professions. It is true that the mass of Jewish doctors who emigrated before the World War have not returned. On the other hand, not a few of the lawyers have been attracted back by the vast business of restitution, though they may stay only for a time. None of the big department stores which were Jewish concerns before 1933 have been reinstated; but Jews have a part in some of the larger industrial enterprises. The cultural life, in which German Jewry before Hitler was eminent, is feeble, despite the efforts of the Council of Jews from Germany, established in England, to strengthen it by sending distinguished lecturers. The many scientists, scholars, writers and artists, who were driven out after 1933, with few exceptions, have not returned. They are enriching the cultural life of other nations. In this connection it is remarkable that the Russians in their Zone have greater magnetic power to attract back a remnant of the Jewish intelligentsia. Arnold Zweig is among the literary stars who have responded to the call and returned from Israel to Berlin. And Dr. E. Meyer, a distinguished historian of music, who lived in England during the war and wrote there the standard book on English Chamber Music, now holds the Chair of the Sociology of Music at the Berlin University in the Eastern Sector.

The fatal weakness of Jewish life in Germany today is its age, the lack of a young generation. Statistically, its age-level is woefully high, so that it appears to be a dying remnant; psychologically, the absence of young men and women, of boys, girls and children, is depressing. German Jewry before the Nazi régime had an ominously declining birth-rate, which declined almost to nothing in the twelve years of Hitler savagery. After the liberation children were born to the survivors of the concentration camps and the displaced persons' camps, but almost all of them have gone to Israel, the United States, or other countries overseas. In the restored communities, such as they are, few children are to be found. Hamburg may be taken as typical. In a community of over one thousand persons, I was told that only forty were under twenty years of age. Only in the one remaining displaced persons' camp in the American Zone will you find a fair proportion of young persons. Of the nineteen hundred

inmates of the camp, four hundred and fifty are under the age of fifteen. The Bavarian Government have recently opened in the camp a model primary school for boys and girls, excellently equipped and staffed with German non-Jewish teachers and one Jewess, who teaches Hebrew. That school supplements a model kindergarten, which was established with the help of the Joint Distribution Committee of America. That premier Jewish philanthropic body has been largely responsible for the restoration of normal life in the Jewish communities, and maintains its benevolent supervision.

Is permanent reconstruction of the communities possible in Germany? Will the few children of the displaced Jews who are now in the country take root and stay? Or is the Jewish population doomed after a generation to utter extinction? It is likely that the answer depends on the future position of Germany in Europe. If the menace of the third World War, with Germany as the first battlefield, were removed, life would be more normal, and birth and marriage would offset death. If, however, the present tension is maintained on the two sides of the "iron curtain" in Central Europe, there is little ground for hope. The community, which for more than a century held the intellectual primacy in Jewry, will be known by its contribution of scholars, scientists, and artists to other countries, by its legacy of literature—and its cemeteries.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

THE SAAR PROBLEM

PERHAPS no other election in Europe has been watched with such international interest and anxiety as the Saar election held on November 30th. Had it not been for a strong protest from the Bonn Parliament objecting to the administration of the election, it is doubtful whether such an interest would have been created. The conflict between the Saar Government and the West German Government came to a head on October 30th, when the former decided by 42 votes to 4 out of 48 deputies to hold the election on November 30th. This decision complied with the Saar Constitution of 1947, which stated that elections had to take place before December 17th, 1952.

The main German objection to the election was created when the Saar Government announced its decision to preclude pro-German political parties from participating in the elections. This was further aggravated when the Saar Government refused Dr. Adenauer's request to postpone the elections until a settlement had been reached in the Franco-German negotiations over the Saar. The result was a complete breakdown in these negotiations, which were progressing satisfactorily up to that time. Moreover, it aroused considerable anger inside Germany, where it was proclaimed that the pro-Germans in Saarland had been denied the right of expressing their views. Thus the Germans could only regard the election as being one-sided, and for this reason appealed to pro-Germans in the Saar either to boycott the election or to spoil their voting papers. The Bonn Government also announced that it would not, under the circumstances, recognise the results of the election. It seems that the

German appeal had little effect locally, for only 7 per cent. of the electorate abstained from voting, and only 24 per cent. spoiled their papers. This was a disappointment to the Germans after the tremendous pressure exercised by the Federal Republic radio, by illegally imported leaflets, by the German press, and meetings held just outside the Saar borders trying to persuade voters to abstain or spoil their papers as a protest at the absence of German parties. Nevertheless, the Germans can have some satisfaction from the efforts to disrupt the election, because this 24 per cent. of spoiled papers compares with slightly 10 per cent. in the 1947 elections. The significance of this is that there are now far more Saarlanders who desire reunion with West Germany than in 1947. This is only natural when it is remembered that the majority are of German origin, and have to a great extent inherited the German way of life.

Saarland formed part of the Rhine Province, and the Bavarian Palatinate from 1815, when France ceded it to Prussia, until it was placed under the rule of the Commission of the League of Nations in January, 1920, for fifteen years, after which a plebiscite was to be held. During this period the Saar mines belonged to the French, to whom the Germans surrendered them as reparations. Hitler had been German Chancellor for two years, when the plebiscite was held in 1935, and Nazi influence secured 90.35 per cent. of the votes which favoured reunion with Germany, while 8.83 per cent. were for the *status quo*, and 0.4 for union with France. The ten years 1935-45 proved an unhappy period for the Saarlanders, for they were subjected to an economic misfit during the first four and a half years, followed by the war, when they experienced two evacuations and felt the full force of terrible bombardments.

At the end of the Second World War, complete chaos prevailed in the densely-populated, highly-industrialised region of the Saar, which formed part of the French-occupied zone of Germany. The French were in a position to press for the annexation of the territory to France, but instead they brought forward a plan for the economic union with France. This allowed for political autonomy but ensured political detachment from Germany. While the plan safeguarded the future of France, it took reasonable measures to revive the economy of the Saar, which was accelerated by the establishment of a Franco-Saar customs and currency union in November, 1947. The French also encouraged the formation of a democratic German administration, and took over a fifty years' lease of the coal mines. This re-established the economic link between the Saar coal and Lorraine iron-ore which had existed for more than seventy years. This union means that there are no customs barriers between France and the Saar, which have the same protective tariffs against the rest of the world. The French franc is legal tender in the Saar, where the French monetary system has been introduced with some modifications, while a joint board administers the railways. The exports to France, chiefly coal and steel, amount to about £106 million a year, second only to the United States in trade with France. Moreover, the total coal and steel output of the union amounts to 34 per cent. of the output of the six countries in the Schuman Coal and Steel Pool, as against Germany's 35 per cent. Had the elections favoured union with Germany, the output of Germany's coal and steel would have increased

to 42 per cent. against France's 27 per cent. This would have given Germany increased powers in the Pool, which France naturally regarded as unfavourable.

Although the Saar party leaders stated during the election campaign that the election was purely an internal matter, and had nothing to do with the international position of the territory, and that the time for a plebiscite was after a Franco-German agreement on the future of the Saar, it cannot be argued that the main issue was whether the Saarlanders wanted to maintain the customs union with France, with the hope of later becoming an almost independent neutral state, with Saarbruecken as the capital of the European coal and steel community, or the return of the territory to Germany. However, the results of the election have clearly shown that the majority of the Saarlanders prefer the former, as 55 per cent. of the votes were in favour of the pro-French Christian People's Party, led by Herr Hoffmann, the Prime Minister.

It cannot be overlooked that these issues were the only ones responsible for the return of the C.P.P. to power. The party had promised that the newly-elected Parliament would be dissolved and a plebiscite held immediately after a Franco-German agreement on the Saar had been reached. Furthermore, M. Schuman promised far-reaching concessions to complete the autonomy of the Saar. These include giving the Saar parity with France in the arbitration of disputes, removing certain veto rights of the French Ambassador in Saarbruecken, providing for the joint management of the Saar mines, and offering concessions to the Saar in foreign trade. All these rights would have to be surrendered on the Europeanisation of the Saar. Therefore the first promise was undoubtedly the most important factor in returning the C.P.P. to power, for it is when this plebiscite is held that the true feelings of the Saarlanders will be displayed. Had pro-German parties been allowed to participate in the election, the results might have been very different.

The economic recovery of Western Germany began the disagreement over the Saar. At the beginning of July, 1950, a small group of middle-class Saarlanders who desired reunion with Germany attached themselves to the three existing Democrat deputies, and drew up an eighteen-point programme insisting on the rights of individuals, which was partly directed against the censorship and other powers used by the French as Occupying Power. Instead of taking the advice of the three deputies, this new Saar Democratic Party (D.P.S.) accepted the leadership of Richard Becker, a former member of the Nazi Party. The D.P.S. was a liberal, nationalistic group highly critical of public expenditure when in opposition. Because of this connection with the Nazi Party the Hoffmann régime regarded the D.P.S. with suspicion, and in May, 1951, the party was suppressed as unconstitutional because it did not accept the political autonomy of the Saar. Dr. Adenauer then raised the first protest, saying there was a lack of democratic freedom in the Saar and that his Government would refuse to recognise the Saar Government. However, a new German Socialist Party (D.S.P.) was formed in the Saar on May 25th, 1952, largely inspired by the excessive German nationalism of the Socialists in Germany. The Christian Democratic Union was, moreover, founded on 3rd June, 1952, which attracted Catholic clergy and former members

of the D.P.S. All these parties have been refused authorisation because they do not recognise the Saar Constitution.

This situation has naturally caused bitterness in trying to settle the question of the Europeanisation of the Saar. France regards this as a most suitable way to relinquish her political and economic rights, which she has held since the war, but she insists upon certain conditions. First, she maintains that the foreign policy and defence of the Saar should be the responsibility either of the Council of Europe or of the European Coal and Steel Community; and this would have to be a permanent solution, and must not be used as an opening for later returning the territory to Germany. France also wants to maintain the Franco-Saar economic and customs union, but is prepared to adapt it to the needs of federation. Dr. Adenauer has insisted that this union should be abolished. The French also state that the fifty years' lease on the Saar mines which they now hold should continue. Neither the French nor Saar Governments are prepared to allow any political parties which aim at re-incorporating the Saar into Germany.

When and if these disagreements can eventually be settled, the Saarlanders will stand to gain, because the High Authority of the Schuman Plan, now seated at Luxembourg, will transfer to Saarbrücken, making the Saar the meeting-place of the six countries represented in it. There is no doubt that such a course would assist in creating an even stronger and more united Europe, but until the French and Germans can agree on a settlement, it will be difficult to ratify the European Army Treaty and the Western Powers' contractual agreements with Germany. It is, therefore, essential for the peace and prosperity of Western Europe that the Franco-German negotiations should be resumed as soon as possible. There seems every hope that this will be achieved, for, despite the defeat of German hopes in the Saar, the West German Government seems to be in a more conciliatory mood, which has lessened Franco-German tension. Whatever agreement is reached, it must not be overlooked that the Saarlanders are a frontier people whose borders have been subjected to changes since the seventeenth century; thus there is no guarantee that, like their frontiers, their outlook will remain unchanged.

E. H. RAWLINGS.

WHAT NEXT IN VIET NAM?

CLAUSEWITZ once affirmed that "war is the continuation of politics by military means." This concept of the "Founder of Prussian militarism" has also been the guiding principle of Soviet post-war policy both in Europe and South-East Asia. An outstanding example is Viet Nam, which is still probably the greatest single problem confronting the Western Powers (as well as Australia and New Zealand) after the war in Korea. The extreme importance of Indo-China in general and Viet Nam in particular to Moscow and Peking alike arises from the fact that success or failure there is bound to entail far-reaching repercussions all round. For that reason alone the problem of Viet Nam is in fact the co-ordination or otherwise of Anglo-Franco-American

policy in the Far East. In recent years this tripartite co-operation has proved to be either non-existent or inadequate in scope on a number of momentous occasions.

The opening months of the year are the traditional period for Viet Nam to make headline news. Large-scale military operations were resumed last October, and are still in progress. After six years of uninterrupted warfare, the "problem" of Viet Nam remains as unsolved as ever. One aspect of it is the continuance of a military and political deadlock which, in addition to the Malayan "Emergency" and the Korean war, conforms to the Communist master-plan of dissipating Western strength in distant countries. Another is the ever-present threat of Chinese intervention. Will Chinese "Volunteers" be made to cross the Tongking mountains into Viet Nam, as once before they crossed the Yalu River? From the political and military point of view, the situation is still far from satisfactory, but considerably better than a year ago. The transfer of authority from French to Vietnamese hands, and the building-up of a Vietnamese national army have been the principal factors underlying this improvement. It is now eight months since the present Nguyen Van Tam government came into power. The event itself was hailed at the time as a turning-point in the short but chequered history of the young state. The composition of the government and the programme it adopted suggested the beginning of the end of that negative "wait-and-see" attitude of Vietnamese opinion to the Bao Dai régime, which in the past constituted the main obstacle to political co-operation. Since then a number of important changes have taken place which are the more significant in a country of untried democracy and an unbalanced economy. Of the internal problems confronting Viet Nam, the most urgent were agrarian reform and national defence. As in all countries of South-East Asia, industrial development in Viet Nam in the last three decades has been rapid, though uneven, and confined mainly to urban centres. As a result, the bulk of the population are still engaged in agriculture. Last July a land reform came into operation which is being gradually carried out in spite of considerable difficulties. It is an ambitious enterprise, involving in the first place the breaking-up of many large estates, especially those of absentee landlords, individual holdings being limited to a maximum of 25 acres. A notable feature of this measure (and an astute political move) was the recognition as legal owners of such peasants as received their land from the one-time Viet Minh authorities. Another was the establishment of a Land Bank to provide smallholders with loans at low rates of interest, enable poor peasants to acquire land, and ensure their protection against that familiar evil of the East—the usurer.

A parallel development was the enactment of a series of other measures. Chief among those were the Labour Code and the Budget. The Labour Code is a comprehensive document covering social security, collective bargaining, the employment of apprentices, industrial injuries, etc. It further provides for free trade-unions and a Labour Inspectorate to supervise the execution of the law. The Budget adopted last year was the first to be presented since Viet Nam was granted self-government in 1949. The national income is estimated at 3,100 million piastres (£52,700,000), of which no less than 58 per cent. are earmarked for

defence. To cover her ordinary and supplementary expenditure, Viet Nam receives financial assistance from France, and economic as well as military aid from the U.S. Political progress has been matched lately in other fields. For the first time since the Japanese war, Viet Nam is again exporting rice and rubber in appreciable quantities. In a South-East Asia where rice is all too often a commodity in short supply, Siam and Viet Nam are at present the only two rice-exporting countries.

But social reforms alone, no matter how significant, are bound to remain largely ineffective without the support of genuinely democratic institutions. Most of these institutions are still in the planning stage, and while the present division of the country into two rival camps continues, their establishment must necessarily be delayed. Nevertheless a beginning has been made with the creation of the permanent machinery of central and local government. Municipal elections took place on January 25th in all areas controlled by the national government of Viet Nam. These are to be followed at a later date by elections for provincial councils and eventually by a parliamentary election. Meanwhile, a Provisional National Council representing all shades of Non-Communist opinion began to function last September as a kind of consultative assembly to assist and advise the government in the day-to-day administration. The fast-moving political pattern in Saigon is, perhaps, best illustrated by the presence of M. Nguyen Van Tam at the head of affairs. Coming from a lower middle-class background, M. Tam is, at fifty-eight, an outstanding politician, who is generally known as "the Strong Man of Viet Nam." The government he presides over is a coalition of Catholics, Caodaists, and Nationalists. A sign of the times is the presence in that government of several Ministers who bitterly opposed the French after 1945. In the short time he has been in power, M. Tam has two solid achievements to his credit: the implementation of long-overdue reforms and the mobilisation of his compatriots for the defence effort. The first of these has led him into conflict with some of his own supporters, to whom his social policy smacks too much of "socialism." The second to him is something that admits of no complacency or half-way houses. M. Nguyen Van Tam can claim to have brought home to Viet Nam the ugly realities of the issue at stake. He himself has had first-hand experience of that issue. Two of his sons were shot by Viet Minh in 1945. A third is General Nguyen Van Hinh, Chief-of-Staff of the national army of Viet Nam. Father and son are facing a task that few men would envy.

Speculation has long revolved round the question of how the war in Indo-China could be brought to an end. An early settlement seems for the present, at any rate, out of reach. So is the possibility of a peace by compromise. Both sides are building up their strength for a war of attrition. The national army of Viet Nam, now seven divisions strong, is playing an ever-increasing part in military operations. For the first time since the outbreak of hostilities, the French Expeditionary Force in Indo-China has been able in recent months to reduce its numbers. This came at a time when French commitments in that country tended to exceed the capacity of France to meet her obligations in Europe in addition to those in the Far East. It is not generally realised that in the past six and a half years the war in Indo-China has tied up twelve French divisions

which could be better employed at home. During that period France spent twice as much in Indo-China as the amount of Marshall Aid she received from America. In terms of outlay and man-power, it represents the equivalent of £1,600 million, and between 40,000 and 50,000 killed or missing. Even with U.S. aid, which in 1953 covers about 40 per cent. of military expenditure in Indo-China, the cost to France this year will still be more than £400 million. French policy now is to speed up the formation of national armies in the three Associated States of Indo-China—Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia—which as time goes on will gradually take over from the French Expeditionary Forces. The need for such national armies is too evident to require elaboration. In the words of the French Secretary of State for Air: "La France ne peut continuer à faire un travail de Penelope."

In this scheme of entrusting the Associated States with their own defence, Viet Nam holds pride of place. One of the first measures of the Tam Government was to impose a Defence Tax, and legislation designed to underpin the defence effort. The national army of Viet Nam, which was founded barely two years ago, has since grown to 141,000 men. Besides the Regular Army, there are four para-military security forces (Forces Supplétives), belonging to the Caodaist, Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen movements. Moreover, a Vietnamese Air Force and a Naval Force are in the process of formation. Of course, there are weaknesses. The most important is the shortage of modern equipment and trained officers and N.C.O.'s. Much has been done, however, to remedy this state of affairs. In recent months U.S. deliveries of arms and equipment have been on a much larger scale than in the past. A similar increase has been recorded in the number of officers graduating from the Dalat Military Academy—the Sandhurst of Viet Nam. Other training centres are in operation for Army and Air Force personnel at Nhatrang and Bien Hoa. The government of Viet Nam has not confined itself to the creation of the fighting services. It has also set up an organisation called GAMO to deal with the re-settlement and rehabilitation of the civilian population in operational zones. GAMO (Groupements Administratifs Mobiles Operationnels) is modelled on the lines of UNRRA, and consists of "Flying Relief Teams" of doctors, teachers, police, etc., which are sent to take over the civil administration in areas wrested from Viet Minh.

At the time of writing the situation in Indo-China is still one of political and military deadlock. In spite of their spectacular successes on the Red River and the Black River, the Viet Minh offensives failed to achieve their main objective, which was the capture of the fertile rice-growing Delta of Tongking. There is ample evidence to show that the Viet Minh are finding the continuation of the war a strain, and an unprofitable strain at that. There is also little doubt that in Ho-Chi-Minh's "Democratic Republic of Viet Nam" divergencies exist between the omnipotent Communists and the Nationalist parties they control. Whether or not Ho-Chi-Minh would be willing to consider the possibility of a negotiated peace on the same terms as the talks at Panmunjon is almost of academic interest. The final word in this matter rests not with him, but with Peking, and—to a certain extent—with Moscow. In the last three years

Chinese influence has steadily grown in the "Democratic Republic of Viet Nam," as the result of China's military and economic aid to the rebels. This aid is provided on a *quid pro quo* basis. Chinese unrequited "exports" include military and industrial equipment for Ho-Chi-Minh's war potential, as well as military instructors for his army. Conversely, the Viet Minh supplies China with a number of strategic raw materials, such as tin, rubber, manganese and wolfram. The relationship between Ho-Chi-Minh and the Chinese should provide a fascinating subject to the student of the East. Emotionally, the Vietnamese have but scant regard for their Chinese neighbours, who were their suzerains for more than a thousand years. In a country where people are famed for their long memories, the occupation of Tongking by the Chinese armies in 1945-1946 has left lasting memories of bitterness for the "traditional enemy of the North." But it is more than doubtful whether the Peking rulers will allow themselves to be swayed by such sentimental considerations. The threat of a "liberation" of Indo-China by Chinese forces is a very real one, which must be realistically faced. On the one hand, there is nothing so far to indicate that the Peking government intends to do more than "keep the pot boiling." But, on the other, the possibility of an armistice or an indefinite stalemate in Korea may well induce the Communist planners to bring greater pressure to bear on Indo-China. The Communist powers seem no more able to afford a stable non-Communist state on China's doorstep than the Western powers could afford to forego one of their key positions in South-East Asia. In the circumstances, the problem of Indo-China and that of Korea are correlated to such a degree that whatever solution is found for the one is bound to affect the outcome of the other.

DAVID INGBER.

ISLAM AND COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE ideological battle for mastery of the Middle East is on. For the past two years, the trail of Communistic agitation has taken me to the superficially Westernised cities of Cairo and Ankara, to the wilds of Kurdistan, from patriarchal Saudi Arabia to the jungles of the Southern Sudan. Experiences during this period gave me an insight into what must surely be one of today's most fascinating "under-cover" stories, in an area whose strategical importance is matched only by a tradition of intrigue, and often overweening personal ambition. For not only has the Middle East today its full complement of partisans of current Western ideologies—and some cast-off ones—but the entire region from Morocco to Kasmir is throbbing with the counter-movement of a brand of fiercely political Islam in modern dress.

Strikingly illustrating this latter activity was an experience I had in Lahore, today one of Pakistan's great cities. It serves to underline the reaction of Islam to what many clerics of Pakistan consider to be a canker in their midst. Millions of refugees from what is now the Indian Republic,

flooding into Pakistan after the sub-continent's partition, have created a problem which is even now—five years later—largely unsolved. Among the many industrial workers beggared by partition and its consequences there were undoubtedly many communists.Flushed by their success in overcoming peasant minds with typical Marxist dialectic, two prominent Red leaders had been challenging religious heads to verbal battle.

I was invited to the discussion. The two communists arrived three hours early, haranguing the crowd with a brilliant display of logic; Islam, they held, was based upon collectivism, was democratic in essence, communistic in practice. Modern communism was only a sane application of the principles enunciated by Mohammed. The three or four thousand peasants and workers were visibly impressed. The Soviets have learned much from the huge Moslem minorities of Russian Central Asia—and know how to put across propaganda in a Moslem land. Finally, in spite of the fact that the religious leaders who were to debate with them were highly respected greybeards, the chief communist wound up his discourse with a vicious attack upon them, charging them with "being behind the times," and not even having a fundamental grasp of logic.

Not being in the secret of what the *Maulavi* (divine) had up his sleeve, I, in company with most of the crowd, began to feel distinctly uneasy. The two maulavis, becloaked, grave, and carrying the Koran, mounted the platform. "Brothers," intoned Sheikh Abdullah, "our friend the communist has told you what he thinks. Out of regard for his feelings that I am too old for the task, I agree that my youngest disciple should address you." A youth—he could not have been more than eighteen—stood up. Calmly, completely self-possessed, he put three questions to the Red leader, to be answered "yes" or "no"—an established pattern of debate in these parts. The first was: "You say Communism and Islam are the same in essence: do you believe in God and the Prophethood of Mohammed and the holiness of this book?"

The communist tried to hedge, but was compelled by Party feelings to answer in the negative. A gasp went up from the crowd. "Do you believe that Marx, Lenin, Stalin or Trotsky were as great as Mohammed or the Four Friends (the four Companions of Mohammed)?" "Yes." By this time the audience were ready to tear the communist apart. Then came, perhaps, the cleverest move of all: "Do you believe that you may be wrong, and that we, the Moslems, may be right, and might be able to convert the Russians and other Communists to our way of thinking?"

One could have heard a pin drop. Even the monkeys in neighbouring trees seemed to have stopped chattering. With one shuddering look at three thousand hostile faces, the communist murmured an admission that this might be the case. Anything that attacks in any way the person of Mohammed or the divine sanction of the Koran is enough in rural Pakistan—and most other places in the Moslem Middle East—to provoke the wildest feelings imaginable. The Maulavi rose to his feet. "Brothers, we have given our friend here a fair hearing. On his first answer he is formally declared an apostate, which means that theoretically sentence of death can be imposed upon him. On the second question he comes under the heading of a mischief-maker. On both counts he claims that he does not subscribe to Islamic principles, therefore everything that he has said

about Communism and Islam being reconcilable comes from one whose testimony on this point cannot be accepted. There is, however, one mitigating factor; he has agreed that it is possible that he may be wrong; therefore, in accordance with Islamic law, if you so agree by raising your right arms, we shall dismiss him with our contempt—for even his answers are inconsistent with logic." Amid a roar of derision, the Red crept away. In a short half-hour his career in Pakistan as a Communist was finished. I have told this true story in some detail as it emphasises the spirit of the Islamic peoples today, and the methods used both by communists and their opponents in the battle for four hundred million people. I have seldom seen anything more effective.

Of all the communists with whom I spoke, one fact stood out in sharp relief. Almost without exception they came from the social category of political malcontents which has multiplied rapidly in the Middle East since the war. None of them showed great signs of mature political thought. I was in every case led to the conclusion that they were, more than anything else, opportunists. Few, if any, would have refused an offer of a large bribe, in money or in kind; indeed, several hinted to me that their respective governments would be compelled, as they thought, eventually to silence them with some political office or reward.

On the other hand, the weakening of tribal and other social institutions by new industrialism in the Middle East has distinctly loosened bonds which formerly kept "borderline cases" within Islamic society. In their petroleum and other undertakings in this area—whether in Egypt, Pakistan or Turkey—the Americans have devised a twofold method of retaining loyalty to the Western cause. First, both officially and otherwise, reprints of important anti-communist writings are circulated among workers and intelligentsia. Secondly—and this struck me as a powerful though typically American method—loyalty to the American firm was generously repaid in extra pay, recognition and promotion.

The Moslem East shares with such lands as Britain one priceless characteristic of its social system: the existence of flexibility in its hierarchy. Just as a nobleman's son here may be a commoner, and has to strive himself for recognition on his own merits, there is no legal or religious sanction in most Moslem lands for the privilege based upon birth: not, at least, in regard to hereditary power. Islam does not permit hereditary kingship, for example. There are no two interpretations of this ruling. And the fact that by a legal fiction kings and princes reign here and there does not make their position any the stronger. This is only one reason why Farouk's uprooting could be so rapidly and effectively achieved. Almost as a paradox, however, there exists side by side with this a remarkably widespread ambition among certain families. A scion of Mohammed's house, for instance, will be universally granted the highest respect—providing he is a courtly, literate and clean-living man. Such a man (known as a Sayed, which denotes "prince" in Arabic) may have as many as ten sons, all Sayeds. Out of these only one or two may attain unusual distinction. The remaining eight will be respected, but will make their lives quietly within the framework of normal society, acting as a leaven which makes the spread of communist ideas almost incredibly difficult. Ambition, which is fostered as already mentioned, by the Americans and

others in the Middle East, is marked among this large aristocracy. By the very virtue of their nobility, not one has yet been known to become a communist; for does not their prominence depend upon the aristocratic principle? American interest may well be expected to expand in this important though delicate field since General Eisenhower's election to the Presidency of the United States, for it was he who, just over three months ago, stated that the Moslem world was vital to America and the free world. Similarly, my talks with British officials recently in the Middle East itself showed that Whitehall's present attitude towards combating communism in the Middle East has stiffened with growing prospects of a settlement with Egypt and the setting up of the strategic defence plans, which include Turkey and other lands with a Moslem population.

What of the Moslem rulers and leaders themselves? Both the King of Jordan and the Regent of Irak told me that collectivism has little appeal in their countries. The scenes of popular acclaim which I witnessed in Amman, Baghdad, and elsewhere for the Hashimite family (themselves descendants of Mohammed) showed plainly enough that communism was making little progress. The Communism Party of Israel, in trying the doubtless Moscow-inspired but hopeless task of preaching at this time Arab-Jewish solidarity against the West, has done incalculable harm to Red prospects in the Levant. Communism's opponents, in fact, have lost no time in photographing and re-circulating (with comments) Arabic handbills smuggled out of Israel and—rather naively—carrying the name and address of the Communist Party of Israel. In Egypt, too, the communists whom I was able to meet were generally foreign-born, or belonged to one or other of the several minorities there. Whatever ex-King Farouk may say in his memoirs about the Moslem Brotherhood being communist-led or inspired, my careful field study of this movement compels me to believe that the Brotherhood is anything but Red. Call them fascist, or fanatical—or anything else; but years of experience of dealing with Reds and crypto-communists showed me that there is absolutely no Marxism in the Brotherhood.

That the present mood of many Egyptians is more or less anti-British may not be denied. I attended perhaps thirty meetings of the Brotherhood, all held in secret. Several of them were attended by well-known religious leaders, who—like all other speakers—confined their harangues almost exclusively to religious affairs. Even the references to Britain and the Sudan were generally incidental. For the communists they expressed nothing but loathing; a feeling which was given effect to in twelve Moslem-Red street brawls in a single week in Cairo and Alexandria. There was no doubt, either, that the Brotherhood movement, in spite of commanding very widespread sympathy in a country terrorised by the Wafd and by Farouk's political police, was exceedingly short of money. Its funds had been frozen by the Government, its schools closed, its leaders were under tedious surveillance. Several leaders spoke to me of the possibility of obtaining funds from such Moslem lands as Pakistan, and I was even made a proposition that I should act as an intermediary in this. Connected with the Brotherhood's work, too, are several members of former ruling families of Central Asia (now under Russian domination) who looked upon the Moslem Brotherhood and its international Islamic

ramifications as a possible source of hope for their restoration. Finally, although I questioned senior police officials about the Ikhwan (Brotherhood) connection with Moscow, none was able—though all were anxious—to supply me with evidence of this supposed link. Even the cotton magnates of the Nile, in their vocal press, were unable to accuse this movement of communistic aims. For these and other reasons, I am convinced that communism in Egypt is confined to the small group among whom I found it. And in spite of the Brotherhood's professed anti-Western feelings, I also believe that it would be quite possible to achieve a *rapprochement* with this movement. The men behind Naguib are prominent in the *Ikhwan*—this I can reveal, for I know them—and some are capitalists in their own way. Neither, for that matter, is Naguib himself the complete figurehead that some would have us believe.

That there are far larger cells of communism in French North Africa cannot be denied. In spite of the effect of such anti-communist elements as the Sultan of Morocco, the Bey of Tunis, or the holy University of Kairouan, such places as Casablanca, Fez, and even Tangier seem to sprout devotees of the red philosophy. While there may be much to justify French opposition to nationalist feeling in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, it is an undeniable fact that religion and nationalism have proved the main checks to Marxism in other Moslem lands: and in North Africa they are inhibited in this aspect of their activities in exact ratio to the extent to which their freedom of action is suppressed. This, equally as strongly as any feeling is exaggerated sympathy, is one of the motives behind the current anxiety of the United Nations "Arab Asian" *bloc* to secure a thorough airing of the North African problem without delay.

It is the three countries of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan—signatories of the Saadabad Pact—which form the real screen between the Islamic Middle East and the Soviet Union proper. Of these, I recently saw in Turkey how traditional hatred of the Russians as such was linked with American aid and reconstruction programmes in such a way as to make ideological penetration of the country next to impossible. And the slight increase of Soviet propaganda activity in North Turkey was recently met by a considerable slackening of the rigid Ankara supervision of all things Islamic. Some Moslems, it is true, have blotted their copybook by taking advantage of the return of Islamic feeling to the country by smashing statues of Kemal Ataturk. On the other hand, the re-discovery of her rich cultural heritage through study of the Islamic period has given many thousands of young Turks a new interest in life.

Next door, in troubled Persia, conditions are not by any means so favourable to freedom's cause. Despite actual experience of Russian occupation during the war, increasing numbers of Persians seemed to me to be turning towards a Marxist interpretation of their present difficulties. Opposing them are the forces of reaction, as they would call them, embodied by the Sumka Fascist Party, and the fanatically Moslem extremists led by Ayatollah Kashani, now Speaker of the Assembly and Dr. Mossadeq's right-hand man. Alone among the Moslem lands which I have visited recently, Persia seems to stand in the gravest danger of a communist coup—if not of actual civil war.

SAYED EL HASHIMI.

CATHERINE THE AUTOCRAT

AT the age of thirty-three Catherine ascended the throne of the Romanoffs with the resolve not merely to reign but to rule. Peter the Great, whom she took as her model, had hoisted Russia into the rank of the Great Powers, and it was her mission to build on his foundations. Having been deliberately excluded from affairs of state she had everything to learn, and she threw herself into her task with unflagging zeal. She attended debates in the Senate, asked questions of officials and private citizens, and recorded her impressions. It was not a pretty picture. Ever since the firm hand of the superman had been removed in 1725 the machinery of government had been running down. The pay of the troops fighting on Prussian soil was many months in arrears; the navy had been so grossly neglected that, in her own words, it was only fit to catch herrings; the national credit had declined, nearly half the revenues of the state failing to reach the Exchequer, and the administration of justice cried aloud for reform. A new broom was urgently required. Knowing little of her vast dominions, she undertook long journeys during the opening years of her reign, and studied the problems of local administration on the spot. The new ruler was as tireless a worker as Peter himself. Only when the executive had regained its authority and was functioning efficiently could she turn to the second item on her programme—the aggrandisement of the empire. How well she was to implement it is indicated by the addition of Courland, Eastern Poland, and the northern littoral of the Black Sea. Unfettered by moral scruples, she adopted the simple maxim formulated by Frederick the Great when he seized Silesia: "If an opportunity is offered me, shall I let it slip?" Why should she not combine with Russia and Austria to cut substantial slices off the Polish joint? And why should she not secure fertile provinces in the south which the Turks were too weak to defend? *Raison d'état* has always been the religion of rulers, and the maxim that the end justifies the means is older than the Jesuits.

Tradition and conviction combined to make Catherine an adherent of the doctrine of enlightened autocracy which dominated the political thinking of the Continent during the eighteenth century. She reached adolescence in the years when Frederick the Great was filling Europe with his fame, and her father was proud to serve as a Prussian officer. Nowhere in Germany could she discover any alternative to the principle of dynastic omnipotence: *Sic volo, sic jubeo*. The conception of self-government, even of a sharing of responsibility, was beyond the range not only of princes but of nearly all the *Intelligentsia*. The stage was occupied by the Cameralists, who accepted the Absolute State as an axiom. Cameralism, as expounded by Seckendorf and Justi, was the theory and practice of administration: though its interpreters hoped to raise the standard, they suggested no sanctions except an appeal to the conscience of the ruler. Instead of proceeding from the needs of the community, the state was their starting-point, its power and opulence their aim. The commonweal is presented sincerely enough as the goal of endeavour, and the happiness of the subject receives lip homage, but they assume that it is secured—and can only be secured—by the will of

the prince. He is exhorted to respect property and the law, and is warned not to overtax his subjects, but they are not to co-operate in the making of laws nor in resisting oppressors. Unlike Hobbes, who demanded nothing beyond the maintenance of order, the Cameralists assume the wisdom and benevolence of the ruler. Thus the difference was not between rival conceptions of the state but between good and bad exponents of the prevailing creed. The Estates, where they still existed, were rather obstacles to progress than instruments of reform. That a Limited Monarchy worked well in England aroused merely academic interest, since the long Parliamentary experience of the island kingdom and the majestic tradition of the Common Law found no counterpart abroad.

The political ideology imbibed by the little princess in her parents' home was enlarged but not substantially modified when she exchanged the narrow horizon of Stettin for the ampler vistas of the Neva. Not even professional flatterers could have described the disreputable régime of the Empress Elizabeth as a model of paternal government, but behind the Tsarina stood the towering figure of her father. From the moment of her arrival the Grand Duchess had been thrilled by the magnificence of his achievements. No name occurs more frequently in her correspondence, and to the end of her days he was rarely out of her thoughts. Here was the superman, *pater patriae*, the first servant of the state, the practical idealist, untiring and resourceful, who built a new capital, opened a window to the West, created a navy, reformed the army, developed trade, dug canals, exploited minerals, introduced religious toleration, and shattered the yoke of a reactionary Church. Her mission, as she realised every year more clearly while she waited for the clock to strike, was to strengthen and enlarge the edifice of which he was the architect, never doubting that she possessed the necessary brains and will. Her self-assurance was fostered by her observation of the third-rate actors on the St. Petersburg stage. On her accession she was ready with a programme of administrative and judicial reform. Peter had made his country a Great Power: it was her task to provide the blessings of civilisation. No minister, no class, no political or ecclesiastical institution stood in her way. The Senate, a legacy of Peter the Great, possessed dignity without power. The Holy Synod, another of his legacies, was merely a department of state. Thirty-four years later she could point with pride to the fulfilment of the larger portion of her plans. The only unanswerable indictment that could be brought against her as a ruler in the context of eighteenth century political ideology was her shameless extravagance towards her lovers, not only during their term of office, but when they were successively hustled off the stage. Shirking labour and responsibility as little as Frederick and Joseph, she left Russia larger and stronger, more respected and more feared, more prosperous and more civilised, than she had found it when she eliminated her feeble husband and seized the throne in 1762.

Catherine was an eager student of *L'Esprit des Lois*, which she described as a breviary for rulers: if she were the Pope, she declared, she would canonise Montesquieu. From its pages she learned the merits of the English Constitution, and she told Diderot that she would gladly have

copied it had the conditions of its successful operation prevailed. But how could the principle of the division of power be adopted in a state mainly composed of illiterate serfs? Since any form of constitutional government was recognised to be impracticable, the first step was to introduce the rudiments of the reign of law. Law, once described by Hooker in a noble passage as the voice of God, came before liberty, which demanded a minimum standard of education and self-control. Peter had issued instructions for the drafting of a code, but nothing had come of it. The plan was revived under Elizabeth, but a driving force was lacking. During the six years of peace which followed her accession, Catherine's abounding energies were largely concentrated on the project of a code which, not only in its broad conception but in its details, could hold its own with the jurisprudence of the West. Three hours of her busy day were set aside for the purpose. She interviewed experts, drafted memoranda, and devoted more thought to her ambitious scheme than Napoleon gave to the French Code. The so-called *Institute* has been described by Kluchevsky, the greatest of Russian historians, as her Political Testament. Though narrower in scope than the Political Testaments of Frederick the Great, it bears in almost equal degree the impress of her personality during the early phase of her reign, and registers the high-water mark of her liberal ideology.

The first result of her efforts was the Code, and a memorandum of 1779 described its gestation. "For two years I read and wrote, and for eighteen months consulted no one, being guided solely by my heart and reason. When I thought I had reached my goal I began to show parts to various people, including Prince Orlov and Count Nikita Panin. The latter remarked. 'These maxims are high explosives.' Prince Orlov praised my work and often wished to show it to others; but I never presented more than a sheet or two at once. Finally I composed the manifesto summoning delegates from the whole Empire in order to learn the conditions of every section of the realm. They assembled in Moscow in 1767. I summoned several persons of different views to hear the Instruction read. Every part provoked disagreement. I allowed them to cancel what they pleased, and they omitted over half of my draft. I bade them take the rest as rules on which opinion could be based, not as a law." These rules were to be read monthly as a guide to the deputies in their law-making activities: they neither formed a code nor created a Parliament, though many foreigners believed that they did.

The experiment of administrative reform aroused wide interest. Frederick the Great applauded its humanitarian spirit and made the Empress a member of the Berlin Academy. The French Consul in Moscow cynically reported that the meetings were reputed to be a comedy staged by despotism masquerading as humanity. The British Secretary of Legation was equally unimpressed. "Knowing the restless disposition of her subjects, the great object of her policy is to occupy them at home and abroad as much as possible. This motive, sharpened by her vanity, has made her undertake to be the legislator of this Empire. But to do it safely she has taken care to have in the Commission only those who will follow her dictates and pay tribute to her generosity, justice and moderation. If these laws were to be brought to a certain level of perfection,

the extreme deficiency of respected and disinterested magistrates would prevent success." The latter criticism was only too well justified, but for the backward condition of Russia on her accession she could not be held responsible.

After years of reflection and discussion, the Empress ordered the election of 564 deputies and the drafting of *cahiers* setting forth grievances. The conference opened on August 4th, 1767, in Moscow, where her draft was laid before them. In addition to the plenary sessions, nineteen special committees were appointed for the consideration of details. The meeting-place was transferred to St. Petersburg in February, 1768, and the Instructions to the Commissioners, containing 655 articles, were signed by the Empress on April 8th, 1768. She was proud of her work, half code, half gazetteer, and desired that it should be widely read by her subjects and in the schools. The more people read it, she added complacently, the less crime there would be. Frequent references to the practices of Greece and Rome jostle moral precepts, disquisitions on the Russian people, and proposals for the reform of the criminal law. Peter the Great, we are reminded, introduced the manners and customs of Europe, but the new work suggests how much remained to be done.

The opening articles breathe the crisp ideology of Enlightened Autocracy. "The sovereign is absolute. The extent of the empire necessitates absolute power in the ruler. Any other form of government would have ruined it. The aim of monarchy is the glory of the citizen, the state, and the sovereign." For the first time in a Russian official document the inhabitants are described as "citizens," a term tacitly involving a right to be governed by the Rule of Law. "The equality of the citizens consists in this: that they shall all be subject to the same laws. No citizen should stand in fear of another." The execution of the laws is entrusted to the Senate. The larger portion of the document is devoted to the reform of the criminal law, where the influence of Beccaria's epoch-making treatise on Crimes and Punishments, published in 1764, is felt in every clause, above all in the injunction: "All maiming ought to be abolished." One of the most striking features of the Instructions is the regret that such a spacious empire was largely an empty land. "Russia is greatly deficient in population and at the same time increases her dominions. Therefore too much encouragement can never be given to the propagation of the human species. The peasants usually have twelve, fifteen, or twenty children by one marriage, but only rarely do a quarter reach maturity." Like Frederick, who welcomed every able-bodied immigrant, she recognised that man-power was the foundation of national strength.

No reference occurs to the most pressing of domestic issues. If the teaching of the West were to be taken seriously, as Catherine took it, serfdom would have to disappear. But such a drastic social and economic revolution would have been fiercely resented by the gentry, and without their acquiescence it was impracticable. Moreover, serfdom lingered on in various forms in several Central European states which were usually regarded as more civilised than Russia. In Prussia abolition had to wait for Stein and Hardenberg, in Austria till the Year of Revolution, in Russia till 1861. Representative institutions, equally ignored in the Instructions, were only grudgingly granted by the last of the Tsars at the opening of

the twentieth century and speedily withdrawn. Thus both the caste system and the technique of autocracy inherited by Catherine were transmitted without significant modifications to her son and his children. Diderot, the most democratic of the *Philosophes* with the exception of Rousseau, argued in his critical analysis of the *Instruction* that the only true sovereign was the nation, and that a good code must begin by compelling the ruler to swear to the law. This ideal, however, remained wishful thinking even in the country of his birth till the French Revolution destroyed the *mystique* of the crown and brought the *Tiers État* to the centre of the stage.

The project of comprehensive reform of the law was held up and finally abandoned owing to the Polish rebellion and the Turkish war. Committees worked at details for several years, but the results of their labours were not embodied in the law of the land. Yet the zeal of the Empress for a more civilised jurisprudence was not wholly in vain, and the summoning of a partially representative Assembly to confer with the sovereign for seventeen months on high matters of state remained a bracing precedent. Catherine made no attempt to conceal her indebtedness to Montesquieu and Beccaria. In presenting a German translation to Frederick, she compared herself to a crow in peacock's feathers, merely claiming the merit of arrangement with a few words or lines of her own thrown in. Though Pokrovsky, the outstanding Communist historian of Russia, complained that she summarised Montesquieu without understanding him, he conceded her energy and good will. Within four years of its completion, the *Instructions* appeared in twenty-four foreign versions, and Voltaire dutifully hailed them as the finest monument of the century. The greatest compliment they received was the refusal of the French Government to allow the entry of two thousand copies, and a generation later the Emperor Paul forbade their circulation in Russia. Portions of the code, indeed, were in advance of most European states. Declarations of rights and projects of reform are not necessarily useless because they have to wait for the flowing tide. Diderot, who was no courtier, described his friend as "L'Impératrice à l'âme grande, de la pénétration, des lumières, un génie très étendu, de la justice, de la bonté, de la patience, et de la fermeté." The "only begetter" of the *Instructions* is the Empress at her best, sharing the belief of the *Aufklärung* in the authority of reason and genuinely anxious to help her backward subjects so far as circumstances allowed.

Catherine's liberal instincts received the first shock in 1773 when Pugatcheff, an illiterate Cossack adventurer, gathered a motley following and marched on Moscow. Asia, it was remarked, had challenged Europe. Though he arrived in chains and was speedily executed, it was the most critical moment of her reign, and its memories haunted her to the end. "They are only a collection of coquins with an impostor at their head," was her first comment; but as the news of massacre and desolation poured in she was undeceived. "Hurry up and exterminate these criminals who disgrace us in the eyes of the world," she wrote to Bibikoff; but the General doubted if the revolt could be suppressed by arms alone, since reforms were needed to remove discontent. The slogan of liberty for the peasants and extermination of the nobility had rallied multitudes to

the rebel flag. It seemed as if the crust of the earth had suddenly opened and she gazed with horror into the bottomless pit. Of palace revolutions she had experience, but now she became aware that volcanic passions were seething in the mob. Her primary duty, she decided, was to affirm the authority of the crown: since the fabric of empire had proved so brittle, it required bonds of steel. The Cossack revolt was the turning-point in her ideological development; henceforth she frowned on popular movements wherever they occurred. The ruler who had saluted Paoli's rebellion in Corsica denounced the revolt of the American Colonies.

The superman—or the superwoman—ought to look as well as to act the part, and this qualification was possessed by Catherine the Great. "I was at first extremely surprised to find her very short," reported Mme. Vigée le Brun, who spent several years painting portraits in Russia. "I had fancied her prodigiously tall, as high as her grandeur. She was very stout, but still had a handsome face, beautifully set off by white curly hair. Genius seemed seated on her lofty forehead. Her eyes were soft and sweet, her nose quite Grecian, her complexion florid, her features very animated." Whatever the *Corps Diplomatique* thought of her policy and her morals, there was no disagreement about her capacity to rule. "Prepared even as I was for the magnificence and parade of this court," reported Sir James Harris, the British Ambassador in 1778, "it exceeds in everything my ideas. To this is joined the most perfect order and decorum. The Empress herself unites in the most wonderful manner the talents of putting those she honours with her conversation at their ease, and of keeping up her own dignity. Her character extends throughout her whole administration; and although she is rigidly obeyed, she has introduced a lenity in the mode of government to which this country was a stranger."

Closer observation revealed that all is not gold which glitters. Only a few weeks later, Sir James struck a very different note. "The system of the Court goes on here in its old train; immense prodigality, and a habit of indolence and procrastination reigns from the first to the last. The incredible vanity of the Sovereign gets the better of her fine parts; she is willing to give credit to any assertion that she supposes to be in consequence of her own greatness and power." The Ambassador was at a disadvantage, for he could not stoop to such flattery as his diplomatic competitors. "My adversaries ever addressed her as a being of a superior nature; and, as she goes near to think herself infallible, she expects to be approached with all the reverence due to a divinity. She is spoiled by flattery and success. Levity and want of precision in her ideas are the weak side of her character, and these increase as she gets older." A similar verdict was passed by the Emperor Joseph after his first visit in 1780 when he impressed her far more favourably than she impressed him. On his return he drafted a letter to his hostess which he sent for approval to Kaunitz, the Foreign Secretary. "Herewith my letter; add or omit as you like. Remember we are dealing with a woman who cares only for herself, and no more for Russia than I do; so we must tickle her. Vanity is her idol; luck and exaggerated compliments have spoiled her. Now we must bay with the wolves." That she cared nothing for her country was a libel, but it was true enough that her vanity grew with advancing years.

Ségur, the French Ambassador appointed in 1785, was equally impressed by his first sight of the sovereign. "She stood there richly attired, her hand resting on a column. Her majestic air, the pride in her countenance, her slightly theatrical pose, clouded my memory." With great presence of mind he improvised an address completely different from that which had been handed in, and to which she had prepared a reply. She seemed surprised, and at a later date asked why he had altered the text. At the moment, he replied, he was upset in the presence of such glory and majesty. This was not mere flattery, for closer acquaintance increased their mutual liking, and he was invited to accompany her on her historic visit to the South in 1787. Not till he showed signs of approval of the ideas of 1789 did her liking for the witty Frenchman begin to wane.

G. P. Gooch.

SVEN HEDIN

EARLY in December, 1952, Sven Hedin died in Stockholm. There are still some regions where man has hardly penetrated, as along the tributaries of the Amazon, but there are no more great blanks left on our maps. The globe has yielded almost its last secrets. The era of intrepid voyagers into the unknown has come to an end. Of the famous galaxy of explorers, from Marco Polo to Humboldt and Stanley, the last survivor was Sven Hedin, the man who conquered, geographically speaking, inner Asia.

He lived on the Maelar Strand road, one of the sights of Stockholm, along the broad sea arm near the City Hall. The seven-storey apartment house belonged to him, as the visitor would guess at once from the frieze of stylised camels in the hall. The top floor, a suite of spacious rooms, was furnished as one entity. Carpets from Turkestan and Ispahan on the parquet floors, silk curtains from Bokhara replacing the doors between the rooms, Peking Buddhas, Korean chests, Tibetan gold filigree *objets d'art*, priceless treasures between and around the high shelves with their sumptuously-bound tomes, of which the titles alone gave one *Wanderlust*; some 7,000 volumes in the eight languages which he read fluently. Behind his large desk, littered with papers, proofs and maps, stood his own works, in up to thirty different translations for most of his fifty or so books. When death came he was still working on the records of his last great journey, the Sino-Swedish expedition between 1927-1935. Accompanied by eight scholars and scientists, each a specialist in his own field—geologists, botanists, and archaeologists—he had travelled from Tibet through inner Asia to Korea. So far 37 volumes have been published; 23 volumes were still to come, on which experts were working full time, sifting and preparing under his guidance the enormous mass of material gathered on what has been the greatest single scientific expedition of our time.

Half a century of travelling, which put his physical endurance to the hardest test, had not diminished the energy of this octogenarian. He continued to work the clock round, albeit in somewhat unorthodox

fashion. He rose at 2 p.m., and started working at 3 p.m.—until 3 a.m.; then he went to bed and for another two hours read "for pleasure." Not until five in the morning did he switch off his lamp. In recent years he only went out for sessions of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science, and had no time for society. His only exercise was a walk on his balcony, which, seventy yards long, spanned the roof of his house on three sides, affording a glorious view over Stockholm—provided one does not suffer from vertigo. I well remember our last meeting, a winter ago. We sat in a corner of the salon. Behind us, in their heavy silver or leather coats-of-arms embossed frames, the autographed photos of emperors and kings, viceroys and *conquistadores* reminded one of the title of the host's Memoirs, of which the first volume, *Great Men and Kings*, was published in 1950. I could not help thinking how incongruous the kindly face of Pius X looked between the martial moustaches and stuck-out chests of the Kaiser and Kitchener.

Sven Hedin came of an old Swedish family with—curious in view of his later friendship with Hitler—distinct Jewish blood. His father was the Stockholm city architect, his grandfather a high state official, his great-grandfather physician to the King. What gave him the itch for travelling? He recalled the thrill of watching the North Pole explorer Nordenskjöld's triumphal return to Stockholm after the ship *Vega* had succeeded in the North-East passage of Asia when he was an impressionable boy. Later, at school, he read of Stanley's meeting with Livingstone. The "blank spaces" on the map began to fascinate him. Their filling would later earn him twice the much-coveted Gold Medal of the London Geographical Society. It so happened that the brother of Alfred Nobel in Baku wanted a tutor for his children. He applied for the job. In Baku he learned Russian, which he spoke fluently, and Tartar. He moved on to Persia, where a fellow-Swede happened to be dentist to the Shah, and learned Persian. "I have almost forgotten that now, but I could brush it up again inside a fortnight," he remarked. Hardly twenty, he published his first book, *Through Persia, Caucasia and Mesopotamia*. After his term at Uppsala, he went to Berlin and later to Halle to study under the greatest geographers of that time, von Richthofen and Kirchhoff. Apart from his first "orientations," he undertook four great expeditions—one lasting ten years—and some "small ones" in between. He went by camel, partly on foot; only the last eighteen months of his last journey were done by car. Today such territories are covered by plane in as many days as they took decades before.

Sven Hedin was in appearance a small man, yet compact of build, accentuated by the *embonpoint* of his last sedentary years. His thinning hair hardly greyed, the complexion of his weather-beaten skin remained rosy. Iritis, developed from rheumatic fever on his first journey, plagued him on and off, and at times threatened him with almost complete blindness; "but it was considerate enough never to trouble me on journeys." The thick lenses of his gold-rimmed spectacles gave a strange depth to his lively brown eyes. As he sat smoking, drawn up in the corner of a settee, he talked in his melodious soft voice of some of the highlights of his life. The first view of the Himalayas: "no more wonderful sight in the world." *Trans-Himalaya* he thought his best book. His nearest

escape from death occurred in the Takla-Makan desert in Eastern Turkestan. All his camels had succumbed and his guides were dying. He went seven days without food and water, and was saved only at the last moment by finding water, afterwards carrying it back in his leather boots to the one companion whose life he could thus save. Swedes agree that he wrote a magnificent prose, and I can well believe it from the way he recounted that greatest escape of his life, the finding of the life-restoring water. As in mimicry he drank, the leather skin of his shrivelled limbs began to live again before one's eyes, and vitality to stream through an almost dead body. Had he not lain the entire day in the shadow of some trees, to gather his last strength to walk to where he guessed that water must be, since from afar he had seen a duck rise in the sky? His greatest thrill among his many discoveries was to find in the middle of the desert, far from any caravan route, the city of Lou-Lan, deserted since the year 300, ruined by the storms of time.

In one of the rooms an entire wall was lined with boxes, each containing his correspondence with a celebrity. Nobel, Hindenburg (letters signed as with the end of a walking-stick dipped in ink), Kitchener (with whom he stayed in Simla), Lord Curzon, and Lord Minto, whom he admired very much. I counted some hundred prominent names, each with its own box, some only revered by scholars and scientists, others as well known as Hitler, whose last long autographed letter dated from 1942. The Swedish public and press rarely mentioned Hedin at first in the post-war years because of that friendship with Hitler and his war-time visit to Berlin. Out of consideration for my octogenarian host, I did not mention the embarrassing subject, but he came to talk about it himself. He frankly admitted that the flood of biographies and recollections after the fall of the Third Reich had upset him considerably. He said that he accepted most of that evidence, and that it had revealed a picture of the Fuehrer very much different from the man he had known. He admitted it with regret, but without reservation. In his last years it regained him the respect of his countrymen, who had wondered so often and long that one of their great sons—and their greatest traveller—could have been such a child in practical politics. One of his closest friends was the present King of Sweden, whom he admired profoundly as a "fine man, a serious scholar with nothing of the amateur in anything which he touches, and a first-rate archaeologist." Occasionally the telephone would ring and Gustav Adolf would inquire, "If you are not too busy, might I call?" One likes to think of sovereign and explorer bending in the stillness of the night over maps of far lands.

KEES VAN HOEK.

EMINENT VICTORIANS

LAST year was the centenary of the publishing of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* by Harriet Beecher Stowe, the book which created such a stir in the literary world when it first appeared. Nowadays it is little read except by students of history and by children. Aimed as an attack on the system of slavery, it effectively roused its readers to realise the mental and physical sufferings experienced by the coloured people on the

plantations of the Southern States of America. The American Civil War ended the system, but the book lives on, though now it is generally regarded as a children's classic. Probably this is due to the simplicity of the language and the fact that many children were among the readers when it ran in serial form. *Uncle Tom's Cabin* quickly became a best-seller and one of the most discussed books of the time. It had its critics: Miss Mitford wrote: "I read about a hundred pages and found the book so painful that I had to put it down and certainly am not likely to take it up again. It is one-sided, exaggerated, false with some cleverness, but of a very disagreeable kind." Macaulay, on the other hand, regarded it as "The most valuable addition that America has made to English Literature." The centenary of the novel may send people back to re-discover the powers of the book, but it is unlikely that any of Harriet Beecher Stowe's later works will be revived. Probably her name will live in literature by one book, as do many of her greater English contemporaries.

Of the large number of men and women who wrote the literature of the last century, only a few are remembered as writers of more than one or two books. Some have almost passed into oblivion, yet their work deserves a better fate. Dickens still remains a prime favourite, but the novels of Thackeray, with the exception of *Vanity Fair*, are not often read. Charles Kingsley's *Water Babies* and *Westward Ho!* are still devoured by children, though adults neglect the novels of his brother Henry. The judgment of a century has perhaps been severe on Lord Lytton, R. D. Blackmore, Charles Reade, and Harrison Ainsworth, best-sellers of their own day. In public libraries the shelves containing the works of George Eliot and Thackeray are rarely disturbed, yet these novelists have much to offer the modern reader. For purity of language and the ability to grip the reader's interest, Thackeray's novels deserve reviving. A great novel realistically portrays human life and conduct, it adds to the reader's knowledge of mankind. Thackeray's works do this, he was a keen observer of human nature, and did not gloss over or caricature his characters. He lived with them, and when he came to write their stories he knew their faults and failings as well as he knew those of his fellow men. Anthony Trollope, whose own novels have been re-discovered in modern times, regarded Thackeray as the first novelist among the then living authors. He observed: "His characters stand as human beings with a force and a thrill which has not, I think, been within the reach of any other English novelist of any period." He also noted: "Whatever Thackeray says the reader cannot fail to understand and whatever he attempts to communicate, he succeeds in conveying."

This is true of *Henry Esmond*, Thackeray's historical novel, which was published one hundred and one years ago this year. It is worthy of a place among the best English historical fiction, for it gives a realistic picture of life in the golden eighteenth century, the age in which Thackeray would have liked to have lived. He had to be content with later times, but when preparing to write *Esmond* he saturated himself with the spirit of the time he wished to portray, and he succeeded in making it live again. Even the style is the style of the eighteenth century without striking a false

note. Charlotte Brontë, who always regarded Thackeray as the great master, even though she could see his faults as a writer, considered that *Henry Esmond* contained too much history and not enough story. As the book deals with the fortunes of a family set against the background of Queen Anne's reign, this criticism is rather unjust. An historical novel should transport the reader to the period with which it deals so that he feels he is really living in those times, and is no mere spectator. *Henry Esmond* does this in no uncertain way. *The Virginians*, written as a sequel, is not so successful, and along with *Pendennis* and *The Newcomes*, it is rather neglected. Yet if these and other works by Thackeray do not reach the standard of *Vanity Fair*, and *Henry Esmond*, they are well worth re-reading for the author never lost his power as a satirist. Much of Thackeray's neglect is due to the fact that he has often been compared with Dickens; in their life-time they were regarded as rivals. This rivalry was fostered by their partisans to such an extent that it still exists today. One critic observed that readers have to give their loyalty to either one or the other. This comparison has helped to discredit Thackeray, who wrote for a smaller, more select public than did Dickens. His style is totally different, as different as their environments had been. Dickens took his work seriously. Thackeray was apt to poke fun or disparage his own books, he even went so far as to state: "after all, Esmond is a prig." Yet he acknowledged Dickens as the greater genius. It is told how after the publication of one of Dickens's books, Thackeray rushed into the office of *Punch* and exclaimed "There's no writing against this; one hasn't an atom of a chance; it's stupendous." But Thackeray has a great deal to offer to any reader who will diligently read his books.

George Eliot, another giant of Victorian literature, is undergoing her period of comparative obscurity. After the death of Thackeray, Dickens and the Brontës, she ruled English fiction, her fame was supported by the serious thinkers of the day as well as by novel readers. Bacon said: "Too much magnifying of men or matter doth irritate contradiction," and this quotation has never been proved more correct than when applied to George Eliot. During her life-time her work was highly acclaimed; now her books remain unread, except by very few people. When George Eliot's first fiction book was published under the title of *Scenes from Clerical Life*, many people thought it was the work of a clergyman who knew rural England thoroughly. Only Dickens tapped a finger on the volume and exclaimed "This is by a woman." The Prince Consort warmly recommended *Adam Bede*, which was published a year later, and Charles Reade regarded it as the finest thing since Shakespeare. All George Eliot's early novels owe a great deal to her memories of the past. When writing *The Mill on the Floss* she observed "At present my mind works with the most freedom and the keenest sense of poetry in my remotest past, and there are many strata to be worked through before I can begin to use artistically any material I may gather at present." It may be considered unfortunate in some ways that she ever succeeded in working through that strata, for when she took to writing her philosophical novels, George Eliot's work lost most of its charm. She was a sincere and profound novelist, with a brilliant brain, but she overlooked the fact that many of her readers might find her new style obscure. Trollope,

who considered her only second to Thackeray as a novelist, had to admit that he doubted whether "any young person can read with pleasure either *Felix Holt*, *Middlemarch*, or *Daniel Deronda*. I know they are difficult to many who are not young," he observed, and he goes on to admit that there were sentences which he had to read three times before he could grasp their meaning.

Probably many readers who have given up George Eliot's work in despair have attempted to read her "difficult" books first, thinking that there they would find the cream of her genius. If they had turned to her early novels they would have discovered that the humour and pathos of her rural stories offer as excellent an escape from our chaos-torn world as do the works of Jane Austen and Trollope. Of George Eliot's historical novel *Romola* there is much controversy. It is unlikely that it will never be read widely, though some critics regard it as worthy of an honoured place in historical fiction. George Eliot put a tremendous amount of research into the book, and she tells of writing it in a state of wretchedness. She observed she began it as a young woman, but felt an old one by the time she finished it. The book certainly gives a true and accurate picture of the time of Savanarola, but it lacks the spark of genuine reality. In some ways it has been compared to *The Cloister and the Hearth*, for Charles Reade always took immense trouble to base his facts on documentary evidence. Yet *The Cloister and the Hearth* has that extra quality which *Romola* lacks. It is through this book that Charles Reade will be remembered. Many of his other fine novels were concerned with social conditions and abuses, and novels written to right some wrong are usually out-dated sooner than any other kind. Charles Kingsley is also remembered more for his historical tales than for his Chartist novels. Yet to any student of history and social conditions, these novelists together with Benjamin Disraeli present an accurate picture of their own times.

Among the many novelists who chose the historical romance as their medium in the last century was Bulwer Lytton, later Lord Lytton. It is said that "he lived with his work, with the doctrine which at the time he wished to preach, thinking always of the effects which he wished to produce." His books are now mostly read by schoolboys, though the accuracy of his research entitles him to a wider circle of readers. Apart from being remembered as the author of *The Last of the Barons* and *The Last Days of Pompeii*, it seems unlikely that his work will ever regain popularity; he had talent but not great genius. Also in the historical fiction field was W. Harrison Ainsworth, the prolific novelist who wrote forty romances set in different centuries. Now only four or five are read, for Ainsworth's inaccuracies have helped to discredit his work. Ainsworth's first important book was *Rookwood*, in which he cast an halo of glamour round the figure of Dick Turpin. It is told how Ainsworth wrote the account of the ride to York in twenty-four hours, he observes "I was strangely at home with my work, and galloped on with my pet highwayman merrily enough." He travelled so fast that he forgot to see if he had the right companion for Dick Turpin did not make the momentous ride from London to York, that was done by Nevinson, another rogue of the road. This habit of glossing over, and indeed,

"doctoring up" rogues as romantic figures has helped to discredit Ainsworth's name in literature. He excelled in inaccuracies, though these did not prevent schoolmasters from giving his books as prizes, for they knew what stepping-stones to greater historical fiction they might become.

Henry Kingsley is a novelist whose books deserve a better fate than they have experienced. When he returned home after spending a few years in Australia, he brought with him the chapters of his book, *Geoffrey Hamlyn*. When Henry's brother Charles read it, he lost no time in showing the book to a publisher, and when it was issued, it was acclaimed as a great novel. Other books followed, including *Ravenshoe* and *Austen Elliot*, but before he died, Henry Kingsley's writing powers were on the decline. In his early works he has left vivid pictures of descriptive writing, for he had a great command of the English language. For this alone his work is worthy of reconsideration. His plots might be shapeless, but this should not distract the modern reader, for many novels with slight plots are published nowadays. "Q" wrote: "In all Henry's books I have not found a single dull page. He may be trivial, inconsequential, irrelevant, absurd, but he never wearies." His books are certainly different from the usual run of literature, and this may well prove to be his work's salvation.

Another best-seller of the time was Charlotte M. Yonge, and to a certain extent her novels have experienced a revival, yet she had talent, not genius, and of her numerous works not many are likely to permanently survive. Yet during the war and to a lesser extent since, her books were re-discovered. This was due to the fact that she gave her readers a glimpse of an equally real world, but one which had not known the miseries of the last few decades. Harriet Martineau, who was born 150 years ago this year, is unlikely to be remembered by her work. In her own day she earned the title of "pioneer of political reform," yet she has little to offer the modern reader. She is unlikely to be remembered unless it is by her children's book, *Feasts on the Fjord*, or her own *Autobiography*, which gives us pictures of famous writers of the last century.

MARION TROUGHTON.

BULGARIA AND TURKEY

FOR the second time within a few months the Turkish-Bulgarian border has been closed, and there is every indication that this will happen more often. Whereas unrest at the Bulgarian-Yugoslav frontier is generally caused by armed incidents, the cold war at the Bulgarian border is waged with different means. Munitions are replaced by human beings. By setting in motion a new wave of migrants, Bulgaria tries to disorganise Turkey's economy and administration, and thus to weaken also her moral resistance. This is the principal motive, though not the only one, for reopening the half-forgotten refugee problem. Undoubtedly it had not escaped the attention of Sofia and Moscow observers that Greece never managed to absorb the 1,500,000 immigrants from Asia Minor after the Anatolian War, although their conditions were comparatively human, and in spite of considerable international aid. Precise statistics relating to the Turkish minorities in Bulgaria with her

total population of 7 million are not available. Their number was estimated at a minimum of 600,000, but 800,000-900,000 might be nearer to the facts. Apart from these ethnic Turks, there are 125,000 so-called Pomaks, Slav-speaking Moslems who regard themselves as Turks.

Strategically it is of importance that the majority of the Turks have settled in areas near the border or the Black Sea coastline. These districts were allotted to them by the Sultans who were anxious to have their route of transit between Russia and Turkey peopled by reliable elements. The Moslem minority was on good terms with the old Bulgarian State. Invariably they voted for the Government candidate and received in return far-reaching autonomy. Kemalist reforms hardly penetrated beyond the border: if anyone felt attracted by them he was free to emigrate. Thus, according to an agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria in 1925, Turks in Bulgaria and Bulgarians in Turkey were permitted to emigrate with all their mobile property, including livestock. They were also free to sell or transfer immobile property, such as houses, businesses, and industrial concerns. Although this purported to be a mutual agreement, it was of little practical importance to the few thousand Bulgarians living in Turkey, of whom hardly any desired to "return home." In the period between 1928, when the agreement began to have practical effect, and 1939, approximately 100,000 Turks came from Bulgaria. It is a remarkable fact that the average annual quota was lowest between 1931 and 1934. In this period Bulgaria had a democratic parliamentary government with respect for human rights.

During the war emigration was reduced to a minimum. Afterwards it fluctuated between 600-800 per annum, until it was totally banned in 1948. Would-be emigrants were subject to brutal persecution. This policy was in keeping with the Moscow line, and its endeavour to prevent any contact with the outside world. Once they had come to power, the Communists even wooed the Turkish minority, presenting them with their own schools, hospitals, theatres, and other cultural institutions. Parallel with this went an intensive propaganda which, with few exceptions, remained unsuccessful. In fact, the trend and subsequent enforcement of collectivisation met with barely-concealed hostility on the part of the Turks. Soon there was no question of cultural autonomy. Turkish schools, mosques, and other religious institutions were placed under State control. When, therefore, in 1950, the Bulgarian Government suddenly and surprisingly decided to permit, and even demand, large-scale emigration—previously only Jews were allowed to emigrate to Israel, a privilege of which nearly all of them took advantage—it was prompted by the desire to get rid of a stubborn and unconvertible minority. Soviet pressure was another important factor. Moscow experts, including the Minister of Transport, had toured Bulgaria and considered non-Slav elements in areas of strategic importance as an acute danger. Furthermore, it might prove a useful economic weapon in the cold war against Turkey.

On August 10th, 1950, the Bulgarian Government informed the Turkish Government that 54,000 passports had been issued to "voluntary" emigrants to Turkey. Within three months, the Turkish Republic

would have to admit 250,000 people who had expressed the wish to emigrate. How far can this emigration be regarded as "voluntary"? The Turks deny it on the ground that one could not describe as a voluntary emigrant any person who had been deprived of all his possessions. In fact, the material points of the 1925 agreement are being totally disregarded by the Bulgarians. Whatever has not been robbed by compulsory collectivisation or expropriation is being sequestered indirectly. The previous owner is required to dispose of his last property, though he is not permitted to take the proceeds with him, either in Bulgarian or in Turkish currency, nor is it possible to exchange houses, or to transfer non-nationalised enterprises, workshops, etc. Most Turkish emigrants wear two shirts and two coats, in order to save at least something. Each family is permitted to take out only a small bundle of their possessions. I am nevertheless of the opinion that in most cases the emigration has been voluntary, despite the fact that the Turks realise that they will reach their new home as beggars. Their motives are partly psychological and moral pressure, as well as dislike or fear of collectivisation. Besides, the conditions of life generally have deteriorated so much in Bulgaria that a refugee existence can hardly be worse. There is little difference whether the proceeds of one's last possessions or one's meagre earnings are being sacrificed for North Korea or other "patriotic" purposes. Last, not least, the Turkish minority faced the threat of deportation. Russia had sent various national groups, including the Volga Germans, to Siberia. The higher cost of transport from the Black Sea would hardly deter her, no more than previously in the case of the Greeks.

In January, 1950, eight months before the official note from Sofia to Ankara, the emigration figure began to rise steadily. In June and July it was between 3,000-4,000, doubling itself in the critical month of August. During September 7,308 impoverished Turks from Bulgaria arrived in Turkey. The threat of an invasion by 250,000 within three months now became acute. In order to avoid submitting to such a terror which violated international law, Turkey had no alternative but to close her frontiers. This placed her in a dilemma. For national and humanitarian reasons, she could hardly deny asylum to citizens escaping from a Communist régime. Moreover, a refusal would have been grist to the Cominform propaganda mill. With all the goodwill in the world, however, it would have been impossible for Turkey to admit 250,000 persons within 90 days. To avoid misunderstandings, State President Celal Bayar declared in the Grand National Assembly that his country would offer asylum to the refugees in a brotherly spirit as soon as normal relations and arrangements with Bulgaria would allow this. Ankara sent detailed proposals to Sofia, but did not receive an immediate reply.

Meanwhile, the Bulgarian authorities continued to deport Turkish refugees to the frontier, where they were "vegetating without means, furniture and shelter, victims to hunger, cold and sickness," according to a cynical statement by Radio Sofia. The emergency huts which they themselves erected provided no shelter, and their frugal meals had to be prepared on an open fire. This inhuman treatment was a strategically well-prepared phase in the Cominform's war of nerves against Turkey. Ankara refused to be provoked, however, and its threat to take the whole

issue to the international forum of the United Nations had an unexpected success. At the end of November, Bulgaria declared herself ready for discussions—obviously on orders of Moscow, which was probably not interested in new international complications at the present time. The Turks were counting with a delay of several months, or at least a few weeks, according to the usual practice. To their surprise, however, Bulgaria accepted all Turkish proposals on September 2nd. Accordingly, Bulgaria agreed to issue exit permits only to those refugees who were in possession of a Turkish entry visa. Turkey reserved the right to send back 72 gipsy families and to reject suspected individuals on security grounds, for they rightly expected Cominform attempts to smuggle Communist agents into Turkey. Finally, Bulgaria promised to respect the 1925 agreement concerning the transfer of mobile property, etc. As was to be expected, this latter promise remained purely theoretical.

From the outset Turkey agreed to take only ethnic Turks and Pomaks. Gipsies, even if they spoke Turkish, were not recognised as Turks. Following this new agreement, a total number of, so far, 152,791 refugees from Bulgaria have found a new home in Turkey, not including Bulgarians who left their country for political reasons. The vast majority of the refugees are peasants. The remainder consists of cobblers, tailors, and other small artisans. Only about 1 per cent. are intellectuals. How are these impoverished refugees cared for? A few buildings with large dormitories were set up near the frontier to receive them. On arrival they are medically examined and politically screened. The committee which decides on their definite admission includes ex-refugees with precise knowledge of local conditions. I was assured that it is hardly possible for a Communist or gipsy to slip through. The care for the refugees is shared by the Red Crescent, which corresponds to the Red Cross organisation, and the Union of Bulgarian Refugees. Nedim Abut, the director of the Red Crescent, co-ordinates the work of both organisations to ensure successful co-operation. The Union of Bulgarian Refugees has so far collected £T8,300,000 in Turkey herself. In addition, individual donations from abroad total £T300,000. Governments and international organisations like the Red Cross, the World Health Organisation and UNESCO (textbooks and other educational material) are equally giving valuable assistance. Twenty tons of powdered milk and clothing to the value of \$120,000 were received from the U.S.A. Textiles sent by Canada represent a value of \$20,000. Sweden, too, contributed 20 tons of clothing.

It usually takes three days until the refugees move on to Edirne, where their accommodation is similar as before. Their food is cooked in communal kitchens. The third stage is Istanbul, and sometimes also Tekirda, especially in the winter, when the daily rate of arrivals soars from 100 to 800. After an interim period lasting from 10-14 days, the artisans are distributed over different towns, and the peasants sent to the country. During the first 27 days, and even longer, if necessary, the food of the immigrants is provided by the Relief Organisations. One family is sent to each village of the 40 Western districts, none of the refugees having been sent to Eastern Anatolia. Every community,

however poor, feels in honour bound to care for its homeless brothers and sisters. This solidarity unites the whole people. For example, the President of State, the President of the Parliament, and the Prime Minister paid several visits to the receiving institutions.

There was only one factor which at first formed a psychological barrier. The farmers were reluctant to share their meagre soil with the new arrivals. A happier solution has now been found, however. Land for the new farms is provided by the State from its own extensive estates, and the Government also finances the houses and modest furniture of the refugees. The settlement of the refugees so far arrived is estimated to cost about 70 million Turkish pounds, of which 30 million were received from ECA funds. In the cultural and ideological sphere, the difference between the resident population and their compatriots from Bulgaria is not considerable. There are hardly any illiterates amongst the latter, whose educational standard is comparatively high. Their agricultural training is even better than of most Turkish farmers, who now profit from their experience, as is so often the case with immigrants.

Thus this vast project of resettlement would proceed in a quiet and orderly fashion but for ever-repeated Bulgarian disturbances. On the last occasion, 161 families and individuals—mostly gipsies, but also political suspects—were smuggled into Turkey. The Turkish Consul summoned from Plovdiv confirmed that the visas were forged. Bulgaria refuses to re-admit these people, and the frontier will remain closed until the Sofia Government reconsiders its attitude. For strategic reasons, Bulgaria will probably give in on this and possibly future occasions. Only another 100,000, and the original figure of 250,000 refugees will have been reached. In all likelihood, however, a further 750,000 will gradually follow. It can be seen, therefore, that the extent of this problem is numerically far in excess of that of the Arab refugees, and the only asylum offered is not, as in the latter case, a whole block of countries, but a single state, burdened with an enormous defence budget.

Since this article has been written, the Turks refused asylum to some refugees from Bulgaria, who allegedly held forged visas and were gipsies and political suspects. Closing of the frontier was the next step. As a reprisal, Sofia then banned all further emigration to Turkey. Generally this step is only regarded as a temporary measure and a new phase in the cold war. The Bulgarian Government intend to discredit Turkey morally as a country which denies entry to its own people. As Ankara realises the strong Bulgarian tendency to get rid of the Mohammedans, all preparations are made to receive new waves of immigrants in the moment Sofia changes her policy again, as she did in 1950.

A. J. FISCHER.

THE NEW DEPRAVITY IN AMERICAN LITERATURE

EVER since an American jurist made straight the way for James Joyce's novel *Ulysses* to be brought into the States, it has been a dogma of American modernism that contemporary fiction is to deny the hierarchy of traditional values. In consequence of this, men and

women who lead Christian lives are scarcely to be found in modern novels. In secular colleges and universities, the students are given to understand that the Victorian Age was the most hypocritical period in modern history. Those persons who have attended colleges euphemistically termed "progressive" are acquainted with this and other of the pet hates of modernist intellectuals. Some of the most violent attacks are directed against the English and American novelists of the late nineteenth century. The charge brought against them is that they ruthlessly suppressed the real facts about man and society. They attack the novelists because they did not reveal on the printed page the "lost weekends" of the era, give complete descriptions of the erotic dreams of fine Boston ladies, nor make clear the methods by which gentlemen of the master class cheated their spouses. The charge is, of course, the old poser: "When are you going to stop beating your wife?" One easily discerns that the modernists who rage at the moral tone of the Victorians are persons who are engaged in developing a new orthodoxy of immorality. Their basic feeling becomes evident in their attitude towards Hemingway and Dos Passos, or, more precisely, the early works of these writers. Soldiers, bullfighters, gangsters, hunters—these are the only real human types in their eyes. If a character has the misfortune to be a retired naval officer of distinguished parentage rather than a truck-driver who speaks in four-letter Anglo-Saxon words and spends his free hours in the precincts of a bordello—woe be unto him. Unless a character is basically a "tough," he is certain to be condemned by the new orthodoxy.

A republic enters upon a period of decay when its intellectual leaders and creative artists are blinded to the importance of ordinary human decency, when the only aspect of humanity a writer chooses to cite is its inhumanity and viciousness. This is our situation today. It is neither amusing nor of little consequence. Society is in a dreadful state when the so-called educated classes reject the cardinal virtues because the vices are more exciting and glamorous. In America at mid-century is not to be found an Increase or Cotton Mather. No witches are burned at the stake in Salem. No maidens are ducked in mill ponds because they have kissed teenagers behind the hawthorn bushes. Nevertheless, a fierce and subtle orthodoxy rages throughout the land. In the realms of literature, drama, and the motion pictures, rigid laws do exist. There is need of a bill of particulars.

If a novel is to be a financial success it must be constructed around what are termed "the facts of life"—as though romance and idealism and the chivalric sensibility were not facts of life when life is at its best. This means there must be considerable discussion of the sexual act, numerous examples of lust, covetousness, obscenity, and crime. A book of the order of John Steinbeck's *Cannery Row* is a gallery of undesirables. In this book the principal characters are harlots and pimps. The characters, naturally, are a scurvy lot of human beings. Were this book a curiosity in the annals of contemporary publishing history, one might venture to say that its appearance was due to a freak impulse on the part of an eccentric editor. Steinbeck is, however, merely representative of a school of writers whose works supposedly reputable publishing houses have made available to the American reading public.

The question arises: "Do the writers like John Steinbeck, John O'Hara, and James T. Farrell present a truthful image of life in this country?" The answer is, I believe, to be found in one's own experience in the States of the Union. Selecting at random one part of the country—say Long Island in New York State—one can carry out a search for the corruption of which our novelists write. True, politics are shoddy—always have been, in fact. But does one discover suburban wives out of their doorways to offer to the passerby the pleasures of the world, the flesh, and the devil? Do our public schools in this part of the country breed abnormal children? Has the bar rail completely triumphed over the altar rail? Do our churches and synagogues stand empty like sepulchres on the holy days and the days of worship? Do the airmen at Long Island's Mitchel Field spend their off-duty hours in cursing the capitalist system and the existing social structure? Is Hempstead a hotbed of vice? The answer to all these questions is, of course, a resounding "No." The life of Long Island towns (like countless towns throughout the country) is basically law-abiding and decent. To be sure, crime, vice, and disorder exist in these towns to a certain limited extent. These things have existed since "Man's first disobedience." Indeed, the majority of Americans observe marriage vows, rear their offspring in love and affection, prove themselves willing to serve their country, seek to live in charity and harmony with their neighbours. It is not entirely because they hope to achieve a bubble of reputation in their locality that American men and women devote so much time to the alleviation of pain—drives for the benefit of crippled children, persons with heart diseases, sufferers with cancer. The aim in citing these facts is not to set forth a bland social gospel, but to stress that American life is a fundamentally decent life. If one comprehends this truth, one will realise that American fiction contains an unwarranted sort of fiction.

In former times the literature of unreality was clearly marked territory. Authors chose as their romantic subject the Malay jungle, the tropic isles of the Western Pacific, or the burning sands of the Sahara. Nowadays the authors of exotic tales, authors whose thinking is best described in Robert Lowell's phrase, "purple pabulum of transcendental moonshine," take up residence on one of the fabulous islands of the Mediterranean and wax rich on their fiction, which has as its subject the spiritual deformity and sexual aberration existing in the hinterland of the United States. Authors of this type (I think of Tennessee Williams) write about Americans in the Southern States in such a manner as to be relished by the upper crust of café society, the international white trash of Miami, Hollywood, and New York. Themselves devoid of even a trace of the traditional religious life, the new champions of decadence and their affluent patrons seek to eradicate our heritage of spiritual cleanliness, the morality of the Old Testament and the New Testament. Decadent writers of the modern type depict morality as neuroticism, patriotism, and provincialism, and piety as humbug. It certainly is a sorry state of affairs that the Truman Capotes, the Gore Vidals, and the Tennessee Williamses find the doors of long-established publishing houses open in welcome.

The motion picture has travelled the same road as the modern novel in English. The management of the motion picture industry has dis-

covered the fact that sadism rings the register, so to speak, at the box-office. Because the industry possesses no other standard than the financial return at the box-office, the country is at this present in the process of having unloaded upon its motion picture screens a mess of brutality and horror. The screen almost drips with the blood of the characters in the new pictures which show knifings, beatings, and the varied forms of brutality. The standard fare of the motion pictures consists of pictures based upon stories which employ the themes of adultery, love between young men and older women, the crimes of children, the inner workings of madhouses. The industry considers such pictures a safe investment in the days of the television threat.

This is one of the most appalling situations this country has ever faced since its beginning. American children are being exposed to comic books in which there is no comedy, but a complete catalogue of bloody crimes committed by sadists. Adults read novels glorifying immorality and physical violence. The American family attending a Saturday night motion picture is forced to witness so-called "dramas" which certainly impart an aura of glamour to adultery and crime. The worst feature of all this is that publishers and producers join in expressions of scientific and liberal piety—assert they are contributing to a fuller understanding of human problems, a new realism, a dynamic appraisal of our ways. Pulled over all the stories and pictures is a net of pseudo-scientism. The actual truth is that the contemporary novel and film do not lead to a greater purity or a better understanding of man's estate. Indeed, they reflect the conspiracy of the immoral against traditional Christian and Jewish morality. When one reads a modern book or attends a motion picture wherein publisher or producer are loud in their assertion of the importance of the frank approach to human problems, one should be exceedingly critical and careful in making a judgment.

The new orthodoxy is fundamentally a transvaluation of values. Modernists are determined to force the acceptance of pornography as medical science, filth as artistic realism, and abnormality as a mere difference of opinion. There actually was a time when artistic standards needed broadening. Today, however, we suffer from a surfeit of so-called "broad-minded" views of human behaviour and human artistry. The situation existing in our time should wake us to a realisation of the necessity for a spectacular reformation in moral standards and aesthetic conceptions. Yet the harsh light of reality makes clear that modern literature, indeed, all the modern efforts at art, have indisposed us to radical measures to save Christian morality and aesthetics. Though the life of the country is basically decent, Americans are in the hands of a cultural ruling class which, having led to destruction the humane elements in our civilisation, is conducting us to ruin.

ANTHONY HARRIGAN.

South Carolina.

THE DUC DE LAUZUN

IN an age outstanding for its corruption and intrigues it is indeed refreshing to consider the one man of noble birth resident in England in 1688 who was prepared to risk his life for the safety of England's Queen and the heir to England's throne. While the "Glorious"

Revolution of 1688 has been selected by many historians for a quite arbitrary canonisation, a closer and more critical examination of the principal actors in the tragedy, their motives and subsequent behaviour, must leave the unbiased student with no inconsiderable amount of admiration for the dethroned King. Despite his proud and unbending nature he possessed qualities of character quite alien to the personalities of the majority of his enemies, with the exception of Russell. His belief in tolerance, in an age of almost fantastic intolerance; in the honesty of his ministers and soldiers, (most of whom held their high offices solely because of his trust in them); in the sincerity of the leaders of the established churches in their professions of non-resistance to the Royal Will; in the natural feelings of the filial loyalty of children to father; all these create in our minds a figure of considerable appeal, particularly when placed against, say, a Churchill or Sunderland. The political naiveté of James unquestionably constitutes the most important factor in the Revolution. It is rather tragic to observe that while his cynical brother Charles, held his throne with ease and dignity, James lived to see the ministers he advanced to power and wealth turn traitor, (Sunderland even using his wife's lover, Sydney, as a go-between in his intrigues against his royal master); his army suborned by Churchill; his own daughter usurping a throne lawfully his; his son slandered and the mark of bastardy imprinted on his forehead by scurrilous Whig pamphleteers; his wife, Mary of Modena, cowering in fear and terror under the tower of Lambeth Church as she and the little Prince crouched there in fear; and who died a pensioner of the House of Bourbon. Indeed were it not for a quarrel, the Royal Stuarts might not even have enjoyed the warm friendship and hospitality which Louis XIV so chivalrously extended to his former equals. By chance a Gascon nobleman, by name Antonin Nompar de Caumont, Marquis de Puyguilhem and later Duke of Lauzun, was in London at the time and was alone willing to risk his life to escort the Queen and the Prince of Wales out of the reach of the London mob to safety in France—a task which no English or Scottish noble would undertake for the sovereign to whom they had sworn allegiance. We may, now that the threads of British and French national history have been so illustriously and inseparably woven together by destiny, honour this gallant Frenchman whose life summons up such a colourful picture in the imagination and of whom Macaulay asserts: "Of this man it has been said that his life was stranger than the dreams of other men."

Born in 1632 he was the son of the Count of Lauzun and his wife Charlotte, a daughter of the Duc de la Force. As a child he was brought up with the children of his influential relative, the Maréchal de Gramont, and he developed a life-long passion for his childhood sweetheart Catherine Charlotte, later Princess of Monaco. As a youth he was remarkably handsome and cultured and a charming and fascinating conversationalist—qualities, which together with a ready wit made him the intimate companion of the young King Louis and a favourite at the brilliant court of France. By no means lacking in courage he was a good soldier, with a natural tendency towards fool-hardiness, and after serving under Turenne, he was promoted colonel of the Royal Regiment of Dragoons. Soon, however, the amorous propensities for which he was later to become so

notorious, brought the headstrong young Gascon into conflict with his royal master. Jealousy, aroused by the interest of Louis in Madame de Monaco, led him to indulge in court intrigues and brought about his disgrace. Louis, in his anger, being scarcely able to control his temper. After a short term of imprisonment in the Bastille he was readmitted to favour in 1670, and fate, which was to play so many tricks upon this gallant soldier, threw into his path an opportunity almost unique in modern history. Anne Maria, Duchess of Montpensier, daughter of Gaston, Duke of Orleans, grand-daughter of King Henry IV and cousin to Louis, fell in love with the young courtier and asked the King's permission to marry Lauzun.

The Duchess, or "La Grande Mademoiselle," as she is more generally called, was herself a character of great historical interest. The daughter of Louis' uncle "Monsieur" and Marie de Montpensier, heiress to the vast domains of the Montpensier family, she was born at the Louvre on May 29th, 1627. As the greatest heiress in France and a princess of royal blood, she had been brought up to expect the hand of a sovereign, most probably that of her first cousin and kinsman, Louis. Among the potential alliances was a marriage with the Prince of Wales, later Charles II. Partly because of ill fortune and partly because of her own hot-headedness, these ambitions were never achieved. This and other influences, possibly her father's in particular, may account for her active participation in the Fronde. Like her lover, Lauzun, she was not lacking in physical or moral courage, and during the second Fronde she appeared before Orleans in March 1652 and demanded in person its surrender. The Governor, torn by conflicting loyalties, temporised, and with the subtle sense of humour peculiar to the French sent Mademoiselle a gift of sweetmeats. Mademoiselle herself tells of subsequent happenings. "I mounted upon a pretty high mound of earth overlooking the gate. I thought but little about any nice way of getting thither. I climbed like a cat, I held on to briars and thorns, and I leaped all the hedges without hurting myself at all: two boats were brought up to serve me for a bridge, and in the second was placed a ladder by which I mounted. The gate burst open at last. Two planks had been forced out of the middle, signs were made to me to advance, and as there was a great deal of mud, a footman took me up, carried me along, and put me through this hole; through which I had no sooner passed my head than drums began beating. I gave my hand to the captain and said to him: 'You will be very glad that you can boast of having managed to get me in!'" Mademoiselle swept all obstacles aside. Later she retreated to Paris, took control of the Bastille and saved the great Condé on July 2nd, 1652, by personally directing the fire of the cannon of the Bastille upon the Royal Troops. This determined the fate of both Condé's action and Mademoiselle's matrimonial ambitions, Cardinal Mazarin remarking (according to Voltaire) "That cannon-shot has just killed her husband!" After the collapse of the Fronde she retired to her estates in disgrace, re-appearing at court in 1657.

These activities together with her haughty nature may well have caused some of the king's relations to thwart her desire to wed Lauzun. For after giving his consent to the match and even allowing the date of the

wedding ceremony to be fixed, Louis yielded to the clamour of his family and forbade the nuptials. Lauzun was later arrested and for ten years was imprisoned at Pignerol, the jail of the mysterious "Man In the Iron Mask." Mademoiselle herself was confined in the Luxembourg for a time, but after negotiations lasting for many years she agreed to buy Lauzun's freedom by settling part of her estates upon Louis' natural son, the Duc de Maine. It appears that desire to appropriate her enormous properties for the benefit of his bastards was the principal cause of Louis' yielding. These vast estates provided the Duchess with an income greatly exceeding the whole revenue of the kingdom of Scotland, and she was in addition Sovereign Princess of Dombes with the right to coin money and administer justice. The properties she had already assigned to her prospective husband were duly given up to the little Duc de Maine, Lauzun was released and the marriage took place secretly. In 1685 Lauzun, still in disgrace with Louis, went to England and was warmly received by the Court of James.

James, after the desertion of his army, (largely due to the treachery of Churchill and Ormonde), seeing that all was lost, resolved to enter into negotiations with William of Orange, in order to gain time in which to prepare for escape to France. There he would raise an army, summon the Irish and the Scots to his banner, drive the arch-traitor Churchill from his Kingdom and win back by force the throne of his illustrious ancestors. William agreed to negotiations, for he bore James but little ill will personally and the King sought for a nobleman whom he could trust with the safety of his wife and heir. It is perhaps a little ironical that the only courtier willing and trustworthy enough for this task was the little French soldier, who, for a foreign king, risked a life for whose safety the greatest lady in France trembled. For London, at this time, was a seething cauldron of boiling hatred and the mob were burning embassies, insulting the ambassadors of Catholic Powers, and threatening with summary justice anyone who even looked like a Jesuit. But all Lauzun's pride and romanticism was touched by the King's trust in him, and arrangements were made for him to take the Queen and young Prince by night to Gravesend, where a boat was kept in readiness. He called at the Palace on the evening of December 10th, 1688, after the household had retired for the night and was received by the King in the royal bed-chamber. "I confide to you my Queen and my son; everything must be risked to carry them to France!" said James. Lauzun proffered his hand to the Queen whilst his friend and companion St. Victor, (a gentleman of Provence), wrapped the little Prince of Wales in his cloak. They left the Palace by a back staircase to embark in an open skiff on a bleak and stormy night. They reached Lambeth and disembarked near an inn where a coach was waiting to take them to Gravesend. Mary, distracted lest any passer-by or servant from the inn should recognize her and the child, crouched stricken with terror under the tower of Lambeth Church whilst the coach was being harnessed. In the pouring rain the coach started off, followed by St. Victor on horseback. The party reached Gravesend, when Lord Powis and three Irish Officers awaited them. They entered the royal yacht and proceeded on their way, the Irishmen ceaselessly watching the captain, ready to stab him to death

at the first sign of treachery. St. Victor rode back to tell the glad news to James, who immediately made preparations for flight.

The Queen landed on French soil the same day and Louis determined to show Europe the conduct worthy of a great gentleman. He gave orders for the Palace of St. Germain (his own former residence) to be prepared for her reception and attended by the court set out to meet his welcome guest. His magnificent state-coach surrounded by Swiss guards and French trumpeters was followed by a hundred gorgeous carriages, containing the noblest blood of the premier nation of Europe. Each of these carriages was drawn by six horses and the courtiers excelled themselves in adorning their persons with jewels and ribands of their rank. At the first sight of the Queen's escort, Louis alighted from his coach and walked on foot to welcome her. They met and he embraced both her and the young prince, and then returned to the Palace of St. Germain with Mary riding at his right hand. The next day, James himself arrived at the exile's palace and after embracing him with brotherly affection Louis led him to the Queen's room. "Here is a gentleman you will be glad to see!" said Louis to the Queen. They were informed that as long as they cared to accept the hospitality of France Louis would esteem it an honour to give them £45,000 a year from his treasury. Lauzun, now in favour with the King (Louis had sent him a letter of thanks in his own handwriting), was able to live with La Grande Mademoiselle, but unfortunately although the apparently impossible had been made possible, they did not enjoy tranquillity for long. He tyrannized over his wife, and they separated. Mademoiselle died after a pious old age in 1693, and Lauzun lived till 1723.

ALAN R. MASON.

PUPPETS IN HISTORY

TO the children of 1953, Muffin the Mule is an intimate friend whom they meet regularly on the television screen. Little do they or their parents realise that between the antics of Muffin and the religious ceremonies of the ancient Greeks 2,500 years ago, there is an historical connection which has never been broken. In fact, puppets spring from the altar of the primitive and savage. The great-great-grandmother puppet lived in a wood and ruled savages. As civilisation advanced, it changed its habits, form, and features, and ceasing to affright man, undertook the happier task of amusing him.

Herodotus, the father of history, tells us that any hilarious guests at an Egyptian feast, were called back to sober propriety by the exhibition of a little skeleton. It taught the severe lesson that gayness today might mean death tomorrow. Herodotus also tells us that the festival of Osiris, or Bacchus, was celebrated in Egypt by the enormous figure of the joyous god, with some mechanism operated by the pulling of a string, being carried in procession by women. The great historian does not say why the women were carrying the god, but we now know that in doing so it was hoped to invoke the deity to give prolific fertility to the Earth. Another Egyptian god, Jupiter Ammon, used to execute his prophecies

by means of strings. Apollo of Heliopolis, an Egyptian imitation of the Greek god of prophecies, would not open his lips until his priests had carried him where he wanted to go. Aloft on the shoulders of his bearers he guided them as with reins. When questioned, he graciously bowed his head if he approved, or fell back if he dissented. When placed on the ground of his temple, he would ascend without aid until his head touched the roof. There he would remain fixed until prayers brought him down again. We do not know how this was done, but it is quite likely that a magnet was used.

Whatever the reason it shows that inanimate objects moving of their own accord was quite an accomplished fact in those days. In fact it was always considered to be proof of their divinity. The most famous of the moving, that is, puppet-like deity, was the god Dionysus, the Greek counterpart of the Roman Bacchus. Clad in a tunic of yellow and gold, the god used to be drawn along in a horse-drawn vehicle in which he rose and sat down majestically, pouring milk from a large jug, to the enjoyment of the thousands of onlookers. Daedalus, a Greek craftsman who made several attempts to imitate the flight of birds, as long ago as 1000 B.C., seems to have been the founder of the art of figure making. It is said that he used to introduce quicksilver into his images, a process which is said to have given them a sort of motion. Legend has it that his figures were so life-like and given to so much activity that they had to be tied up with strings when not wanted to move or they were apt to run continuously without stopping. The puppets which the Greeks used belong to this school of Daedalus, being generally made of wood or baked clay, and set in motion by strings. In our modern technical phraseology, we would call them marionettes, puppets being, strictly speaking, confined to objects moved by hand. Antiochus, a half-brother of Cleopatra, who had a very inventive mind, was probably the inventor of the marionette. His favourite toys were animals whose limbs were moved by strings, and so fond was he of making them that his real job of making weapons of war suffered. So much so in fact that he was blamed for his country's lack of preparedness for war when it was later attacked. Critics said he preferred to play with puppets instead of attending to the defence of his kingdom.

In Roman times the Italian temples were famous for the gods who moved. The statue of Servius Tullus, is said to have shaded his eyes whenever his daughter, Tullia, who murdered him, passed before him. It was not uncommon for the images of the gods, when displeased, to turn away their heads from the meat placed before them, a bad omen which filled the whole district with terror and a desire to do whatever the priests wished them to do. With the arrival of Christianity puppets found favour with some of the early Fathers of the Church, perhaps for the reason that more decency was observed in the speeches of the puppet shows than in the sometimes quite immoral stage plays. Others declared, however, that it was immoral and not lawful, but the fashion prevailed and puppets entered the Christian stage. At the end of the eighth century images of the Lord and the Madonna with limbs moved by strings, became common throughout Europe. One is said to have moved through the city of Lucca on foot, blessing the people as it passed along. The Boxley

Madonna in Kent not only moved its head but opened and closed its eyes as well. From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century puppets were suppressed by the Church. They reappeared in the sixteenth century in Italy, and later went to Spain but here they were never really popular. At the end of the seventeenth century images of Christ were made which were so flexible that it was difficult to distinguish between them and a dead body. In vain several city councils tried to forbid their manufacture. Some were so ingeniously made and of such exquisite workmanship, that the makers of them were accused of having the Devil for an ally. The ablest artists included the priests themselves, some were to be found among the popes.

The Greeks were great lovers of puppet plays in public, and were allowed to do so even when the ordinary theatre was banned. Strangely enough history repeated itself in Italy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when puppet shows managed to evade the political and church censorships which so dominated life in those days. As in Italy, puppets alone had full freedom of speech in France, when all other kinds of liberty were dead. During the terror of the French Revolution puppet shows entertained those waiting to witness the execution of new victims. Indeed we are told that Punch daily filled up the intervals of execution, and so varied the pleasures of a rather impatient crowd. In those fierce and democratic times, not even Punch could escape his fate. When he once ventured on some jokes against the terrorists, the puppet master and his wife were thrown into prison, and after a brief confinement were executed on the same spot whereon the King and Queen had fallen. During the last war, too, the puppet theatres kept up the tradition of the freedom of speech. They provided opportunities in occupied Europe for biting anti-Nazi comments which went undetected. The Belgian Punch, Tchantche, fought so bravely for Belgian independence that a statue has now been erected to him in Liege. Right through the German occupation, he used every opportunity to criticise the Nazis in puppet plays. This was done so subtly that the Germans had not the slightest idea of what was going on.

In England puppets became popular in the seventeenth century, as the famous Pepys recorded: "12th Nov. 1661. My wife and I to 'Bartholomew Fayre', with puppets . . . ; but though I love the play as much as ever I did, yet I do not like the puppets at all, but think it to be a lessening to it." On the 9th May of the following year, we find him at Covent Garden—"to see an Italian puppet play that is within the rayles there—the best that ever I saw, and a great resort of gallants." In a fortnight he takes poor Mrs. Pepys to see the same play. A few months later he says—"Lord Sandwich is at Whitehall with the King, before whom puppet plays I saw this summer in Covent Garden, are acted this night." On the 30th August 1667, being with a merry party at Walthamstow, he left his wife to get home as well as she could—"I to Bartholomew Fayre to walk up and down, and there, among other things, find my Lady Castlemaine at a puppet play 'Patient Grizell'" On the 5th September 1668, Pepys is again on the old ground . . . "to see the play 'Bartholomew Fayre' with puppets. And it is an excellent play, the more I see of it the more I love the wit of it."

Thus in England puppets have never really been forgotten. Punch and Judy have delighted millions of children, but it needed the medium of the television screen, which is an ideal setting for the puppet play to give the marionette a new lease of life. Incidentally, marionette, the French word for puppet, applied originally to only religious plays in which the Virgin Mary featured. Muffin the Mule who became alive in a "circus" part of a puppet play run by Jan Bussell and his wife Ann Hogarth, has taken the children's heart by storm. Other masters of the puppet show are Sheila Rein and Waldo Lanchester, perhaps our chief living puppet master, with his own marionette theatre at Malvern, and the American Bob Bromley, who introduced puppets to Hollywood.

Apart from amusements, puppets play their part in education and psychiatry. More and more puppetry is taught in schools, not only as part of the art and craft lesson, but to make history and geography "come alive" to children. The Educational Puppetry Association, promotes puppetry as an educational medium, and tries to develop its possibilities as a method in psycho- and occupational-therapy and speech training. Parents are fast realising the enormous value of encouraging children to work with puppets. Apart from stimulating the imagination, the craft of puppetry develops latent talent, and as dialogue is necessary in relation to the movement, the mental faculties are brought into play together with clear concise speech. Lastly there are the psychologist and psychotherapist who use marionettes in treating backward and abnormal children. In his fears and dislikes the child identifies himself with his puppets, a primitive impulse that goes back to the beginning of history. Primitive people thought it less dangerous to make an image of man or a god into which some of his qualities might enter, than to assume his personality himself. They thought it was much safer to give life to an image so that it could draw off the good or evil qualities of the god into themselves. The maladjusted child apparently seems to feel the same way, and the psychologist finds puppets an excellent medium of treatment. The link between past and present is complete. Between Muffin the Mule and the crude string-pulled wooden images of the ancients, there is a long chain of links which have not been broken, and which, in some form or other, will probably continue as long as man inhabits this planet.

MAX GORDON.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MR. STALIN AND PEACE

NOT for the first, nor probably for the last, time Mr. Stalin has said something about that remarkable thing (remarkable mainly because, despite the talk, there seems to be no such thing) which we know in the jargon of high diplomacy as "peace." With a grim persistence in endeavour an American journalist has again interviewed Mr. Stalin in this context. Through the medium of the Soviet Embassy in Washington Mr. James Reston of the *New York Times* on December 18th last, propounded four questions for Mr. Stalin to answer. On Christmas

Day, whether or no the day was chosen deliberately for effect in the West, Mr. Stalin decided to answer the questions. It is probably one's duty to read what he said, on the off chance of detecting something new in it. He said that "war between the United States of America and the Soviet Union cannot be considered inevitable," thereby repeating in effect what he said on April 1st last in answer to a similar journalistic enterprise. He also said that "the U.S.S.R. is interested in ending the war in Korea": this on the morrow of the U.S.S.R.'s rejection of the United Nation's plan to end that war. And, need it be added? he took the occasion to diagnose the source of the tension in the world as being "everywhere and in everything wherever the aggressive actions of the policy of the 'cold war' against the Soviet Union find their expression." Finally, he regarded "favourably" the suggestion that diplomatic conversations might be held "looking towards the possibility of a meeting" with General Eisenhower "on easing world tension."

Those who, for their sins or for another reason, are bound to be perpetually studying the shallow sordidty of high diplomacy, and in particular the complicated mentality of Mr. Stalin's part in it, find it increasingly hard to whip up much interest in the subject. On the day that followed Mr. Stalin's answers to the questions that had been put to him, the *New York Times* made the jaded comment that "at first sight, and viewing Mr. Stalin's words in the light of the Soviet record, there is little reason to hope that they represent anything more than just another psychological warfare manoeuvre in the phoney Soviet 'peace offensive' and another attempt to deceive the world."

There is, however, perhaps one aspect of this chronic deadlock that provokes some slight attention. What normal sane people throughout the world, including the millions who have fallen victim to the tyranny of the Kremlin, do not cease to wonder about is the danger of another world war. Speech may be controlled or punished. Thought is free. It may therefore be assumed that human beings in general are at this time concerned, openly or secretly, about the issue of peace or war in the international field. The iron curtain constitutes a substantial barrier between the two halves of the political world because on the communist side of it the authorities are in full control of information, and the peoples are regularly deceived. They are told only what the Kremlin decides they shall be told about what takes place in the west, and they are told a good deal about concocted events that do not take place. When one considers the implication of the word "peace"—that "tranquillity of order" and reward of good principle faithfully translated into practice—it becomes clear that peace cannot be built on a foundation of lies. The Kremlin method of deliberate deception is therefore in itself an almost decisive barrier to peace in the true sense of the word.

But it is not the only barrier. For longer than a generation the ruling strategists of the Soviet Union have used a propagated distrust of the foreigner as a lever in their tyranny. By all the means at their disposal, by the spoken or the printed word, by the medium of monstrous public trials of "traitors," both Lenin and Stalin always represented the outside world as an enemy to the subject peoples of the Soviet Union, thereby bidding for those peoples' support in their own supposed interest of self-

preservation. Whenever the time came for the liquidation of bolshevist leaders who had fallen foul of the dictator-in-chief, they were put on public trial as spies or agents who had betrayed their country to some foreign hostile government (formerly the British government, latterly as a rule the United States Government); and by the methods that are now well enough known in all their incredible brutality, the accused persons were regularly induced to confess their guilt in that sense. Whether any human beings can be thus effectively or lastingly bemused, as the Russian strategists apparently still believe to be possible, may be doubted, even when the apparatus of deception is so complete; but the real problem to those of us who fortunately live on the right side of that iron curtain is this: how is it possible to go on talking about international peace when we know that the Russian leaders depend for their own continued existence upon the absence of real peace? An acknowledged sense of security and a consequent throwing down of the iron curtain would be the shortest cut to the liberation of the peoples held down by the Kremlin: and the Kremlin leaders know it.

There may not be as a matter of fact any practical prospect of open war on the large scale; indeed no one today could even imagine any *casus belli* if he were challenged to detect one; but the obstinate, devilish fact remains that Stalin's own position is judged by himself to depend upon the artificial continuance of a supposed danger of war. If the people of the Soviet Union were allowed to believe that there was little danger of a third world war, or if they were presented with any such cheerful facts as an end to the war in Korea, it would be the more difficult for Stalin to keep them down. His most potent instrument of subjection is the cultivated fear of the foreign "imperialist" Powers whose purpose is represented, in season and out, as that of attacking the innocent Soviet Union and its associates. The war in Korea—which has consistently been represented to the people of Russia by a total violation of the facts as an American imperialist aggression—is something like a personal necessity to Stalin. No one who is in the least conversant with what is taking place in the world has been surprised by the fact that cease-fire negotiations have taken place in Panmunjom for nearly two years without any danger being incurred—danger from Stalin's point of view—of a cease-fire being in fact agreed upon; nor by the fact that in the United Nations the Indian proposal for an end of the war in Korea was promptly and uncompromisingly blocked by Russia and her dragooned satellites.

Stalin is afraid of peace. It is not merely that his Kremlin headquarters calculate that western resources in men and material are being dissipated on the blood-soaked hills of Korea, the while no corresponding loss is suffered on Russia's part; the more relevant factor is the ideological pretence aforesaid. It is wholly in keeping with that pretence, which is cardinal to Stalin's *mainmise* over his dupes, that when he is interviewed on such a subject as peace, he must introduce such unpeaceful lies as that about a cold war being waged by the United States upon the Soviet Union. Always the keynote is an alleged foreign attack or a hostile intent, against the Soviet Union. It is hardly necessary to quote instances, because the theme is continuous. At all costs, according to Stalin's reading of his own necessities, the truth must be kept out of Russia, and the fear kept in.

In the early part of last year (see this section of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, June 1952, pp. 372 *et seqq*) a party of fifty American editors who were making a fact-finding tour of Western Europe and the Middle East sent several telegrams to Mr. Stalin asking if they might visit him in Moscow so that they could make "a complete and honest report to the people of the United States on your views concerning the international situation." The reason why they sent several telegrams was that none of them was answered. The one thing that Stalin could not risk was the presence in Russia, and contact with the Russian people, of fifty American newspaper editors, capable of disillusioning the said people about the lies on which they were habitually fed.

But when in despair they finally sent him a telegram (March 24th, 1952) asking him, not if they might go and see him, but if he would telegraph an answer to certain questions there and then put to him, he did condescend to give them an answer at the safe distance. Indeed he seems to like answering foreign questions at a distance because his answers, all of them incorporating the propaganda that is the breath of his nostrils, are then gratuitously propagated in the columns of the *New York Times* (on for instance the most recent occasion) or of fifty American newspapers (on the occasion of nine months earlier), and are then reproduced in the newspapers of all the western countries.

Sometimes he seems to sense the need for an inoculation of propaganda into his own people in a routine therapy of keeping up their *moral*, as when, on February 16th, 1951, he answered a series of questions, put by himself to himself, in the columns of *Pravda*. The point of that particular interview of himself by himself was the stressing of the fact that Mr. Attlee, who was then the Prime Minister in Britain, was deceiving the British people about Russia. It seems to be one of the odd features of warped human nature that when a man engages regularly upon a course of deception, he becomes obsessed with the idea that it is somebody else who is lying, and lying against himself. The probable explanation is that as he himself lies so easily and fluently, he assumes that every other human being possesses and exercises the like facility. What Stalin said in *Pravda* on February 16th, 1951 was this: "Mr. Attlee needs a lie against the Soviet Union, and it is essential for him to depict the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union as an aggressive one, and the aggressive policy of the British Government as a peaceful one, in order to mislead the British people and draw them by means of deceit to the new world war being organised by the ruling circles of the United States." There is something almost autobiographical, *mutatis quibusdam mutandis*, as well as automatic in that particular performance on the part of Mr. Stalin.

The factor here elaborated of the present unhealthy situation is perfectly well known. The real problem for western ingenuity is to call Mr. Stalin's bluff in circumstances where Mr. Stalin's henchmen are in full control of the production and distribution of "news" throughout the Russian lands. The technique of what is called propaganda in its modern extravagances is of a formidable potentiality. When the Kremlin can and does decide absolutely what is read or otherwise imbibed by the half of the world it controls, it is obvious that there can be no progress

towards "peace" in any realistic sense of the word.

But that fact is not the end of the matter. It happens also that the very expansion of the Kremlin's empire is its greatest source of weakness. The swollen frog looks big; the bigger it becomes, the greater the danger: to itself. We have had contemporary experience of such a circumstance in the international field. When in 1940 Hitler (whose intelligence was undermined by his own megalomania) danced for joy on the Atlantic coast of France and his panzers roamed without opposition over the continent of Europe, he did not see that thereby he had reached, not the zenith of his ambition, but the point of greatest danger to himself. It was not merely that his lines of communication were dangerously stretched, and involved a drain upon his oil supplies such as set a mathematical limit to his exuberance. The more important thing was that he had incorporated foreign and hostile elements within his lines which by all the known facts of human nature were bound to be his undoing. It is one of the facts of life that human beings cannot be held down by force. An overlordship depends in the long run upon the voluntary loyalty of the subject. In the alternative—ask any Irishman, any Pole, any Czech—there is no limit to the length of resistance that will be put up by the enslaved peoples, upon whom the slavery acts as an unending provocation, nor to the ingenuity with which resistance is engineered and prosecuted. In our time we have had experience of such resistance movements. Czechoslovakia provides an interesting example. Despite the inherent advantages of a territorial and religious combination which the Habsburgs offered to Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes before the first world war of the present century, the short-sighted selfishness of the Germans and the Magyars who controlled it acted as a spur and a provocation to the subject peoples which in the end inevitably disrupted the empire and thereby earned for it the historic epithet "ramshackle." All empire is ramshackle that does not win consent; for the human spirit is a creation of Almighty God and is therefore proof against man's folly.

Today the Kremlin repeats on a far worse scale the blunders committed half a century ago by the Habsburgs. The recent Slansky trial in Prague—which in the words of the Archbishop of York "outraged the conscience of the civilised world"—was a mere rumble of the earthquake. Even the corpses of the so-called traitors continue to inspire fear in the Kremlin, with the result that a continuing and even increasing wave of abuse is still directed against the dead Slansky and his "gang of traitors"—that gang which so lately was constituted by the blue-eyed boys who bore aloft the torch of the Kremlin's authority. These savage liquidations of former henchmen are an eloquent proof of the fear inspired by events, not in the subject people, but in the overlords.

The experienced student of affairs in Europe keeps his eyes on Czechoslovakia. The country stands as it were at the junction of east and west, of Slav and Teuton, of atheist and Christian, of enslaved and free. Its people are tough. They are past masters in the tricks of escape from oppressors. Caught as it were in the pincers of east and west they have in our time suffered from both sides. Thomas Masaryk led them out of the tyranny imposed upon them by Vienna and Budapest only for Edward Benesh to lead them through a combination of fate and miscalculation,

into a worse tyranny than Vienna or Budapest ever dreamt of. It was a cruel decision that Benesh had to take; and it cost him his life. Calculating after Munich in 1938 that the west could no longer be counted reliable as a protection for Czechoslovakia against Germany, he turned to Russia instead. He discovered too late that his new defender was a far worse enemy than anything ever emerging from the Kaiser's or Hitler's Germany, from the Germans of Vienna, or the Magyars of Budapest. The last state of Czechoslovakia is worse than the first. But the Kremlin has made no greater a blunder than to excite the resistance of such a people as the Czechs, who are even more unconquerable than the Poles, the Lithuanians, or the Irish. The Slansky trial is probably not the last indication we shall be given of Russian panic over threatened Czechoslovak defection.

The subsidiary importance of Prague in the general situation obviously derives from the probability that a successful revolt against bolshevik tyranny in that capital would unleash the waiting revolt in Warsaw, in Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Kaunas. It is not surprising that the dozen plotters of the Kremlin are afraid; nor that they try to keep afame the fear of the United States that they so unremittingly kindle in Russian and in satellite breasts.

This modern tyranny, bolstered by the cultivated fear of a supposed enemy beyond the border, living on its nerves, dependent upon a continued artificial fear of war, afraid of actual peace, will inevitably go the way of all ramshackle empires. Seldom in history was any empire so ramshackle as this. The whole world seems to be involved in the issue that is presented to the Kremlin: namely, are Stalin and his men to go on buttressing their own tyranny by the deliberate cultivation of the fear of war among their victims? That tactic runs the risk of precipitating war even though such an upshot would be the last thing they want, because the consistent policy pursued by Moscow's representatives, whether in the United Nations or in Panmunjom, of refusing to register any agreement about anything with the western Powers encourages another sort of fear in the west: the plain straightforward fear of world war. The gigantic process of western rearmament, a symptom of that western fear, is claimed in the west to be a safeguard; and it may indeed dissuade the Moscow planners from pushing their own propaganda too far. None the less it makes no contribution to general security that the two halves of a broken world should thus madly be piling up armaments against each other. The problem is an obviously psychological one. How can this nightmare of diplomatic shadow-fighting be dissipated? On the last day of December last President Auriol suggested, not for the first time, that the heads of the Great Powers in the west should meet Mr. Stalin for talks on the exclusive subject of peace, of easing the tension, of working out a *modus vivendi*. On the same day Mr. Churchill sailed from Southampton for the United States en route for a holiday in Jamaica, intending to break his journey for talks with General Eisenhower and President Truman on precisely—could there by any other topic?—this question of international accommodation.

In our time we have reached the pass where the swollen power of governments swamps every other influence in public life, and works on

so egregiously low a level that its leaders are exercised about the elementary project of avoiding a third world war. After two such wars in half a century, faced with the unmistakable horror of what would be involved in a third, not knowing what possible reason could be given for the waging of another such war, these political leaders none the less solemnly talk about the possibility of meeting each other to discuss the avoidance by themselves of an unnecessary and gratuitous catastrophe. The analogy would be, if a comparable level could be imagined in ordinary human intercourse, that half a dozen men in different walks of life should seek a conference with each other in order exclusively to discuss ways and means of refraining from murdering each other. The answer obviously is that international political intercourse has broken loose from the restraints of commonsense. It is not governed by ordinary human reason or faith.

From that fact emerges the clue to an understanding of what is wrong, and therefore to the solution. What is wrong is that the sanction in human relationships of individual good sense has been lost in an uncharted sea of political power: of power, that is, without bearings, without direction, without control, exposed helplessly to the elements of chance. It is obvious to any mind that has chosen to pay a moment's attention to the matter, that the only sovereign directive in the chaos that otherwise is life is the individual human soul guided by the grace of God. It is a notorious fact that a political government as such is necessarily "soulless" in a literal sense, because it acts on the theoretic sanction of a nation at large and the true relation between act and responsibility is lost in a sea of people, millions of them, all different, none of them consciously contributing to the collective responsibility. An uncharted sea seems to be the not unfair analogy. Now individuals tend in contact with each other to behave sensibly and charitably, because the channel from God to man runs through the individual. That is why the notion of half a dozen individuals holding conference to safeguard themselves from the danger of murdering each other is in its essence unrealistic and even comic; whereas the notion of half a dozen Prime Ministers acting as the representatives of nations meeting for the like purpose on a collective scale is both realistic and commonplace, and falls within the solemn range of practical politics. So far from being comic, it is tragic in its actual evil consequence. Peace, which after all is the ideal of high diplomacy, is unattained and unattainable until a solution be found to the problem of enthroning the goodness of the individual in the sphere of collective enterprise. Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers are in fact individuals when they are off duty; but when acting as officials they tend to become dehumanised robots bereft of commonsense, decency and charity alike. In the United Nations it is a common spectacle for the Russian representative to accuse the United States of brutality, aggression, deceit and what not and then to retire with the United States delegate for a drink or a luncheon together in the friendliest spirit. The problem in international relationships is to carry over into the public sphere the sort of human charity that rules in the private sphere. Such a thing is impossible without the grace of God, as are all human projects.

The peculiar difficulty in this case is that the Russian robots not only

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do not receive, they reject and ideologically deny, the grace of God, and claim to be "atheists." They therefore contrive to deceive themselves, because no human being, unless he deceive himself, can even imagine himself to be an atheist, any more than a pot, if it could think, could deny the existence of the potter. Who made Mr. Stalin? The bolshevik argument, even on the ground of the unaided intellect, is a woe-begone form of bankruptcy. For a man to claim that he cannot believe or accept (and this is what the materialist "philosophers" actually say) anything which is not palpable to his brains, ignores the inevitable question: Who made the brains? Self-convicted, however, as are the materialists even on their own ground, the melancholy fact remains that they are hoist with their own petard, and they happen to have recruited in their support a host of deluded human beings who help to spread the resultant distress throughout the world. It is arguable that, though general fear of the atomic bomb may, and probably will, save mankind from the irreparable climax of a third world war, yet there can be no "peace" in any true sense until the materialists (who are not confined to one side of the iron curtain) open their eyes to the basic spiritual truth that sustains and accounts for human life.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

January 11th, 1953.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUEEN VICTORIA AND HER PRIME MINISTERS

No one could be better qualified than Mr. Algernon Cecil to deal with the subject of Queen Victoria and her ten Prime Ministers. In the first place he is an experienced writer with many admirable books to his credit. In the second place, he is extremely well versed in the literature and in the traditional lore of the Victorian Age. And thirdly, however much individual critics may differ from his speculative opinions, it seems that on the matters which are the subject of this volume he has a sound judgment and a fine appreciation of the truth. At times he is discursive, and even remarkably so, but the nature of his subject involves an occasional departure from the matter in hand. Six of the Prime Ministers in question, Melbourne, Peel, Russell, Derby, Aberdeen and Palmerston had long and distinguished careers before Queen Victoria came to the throne, so that it was indispensable for Mr. Cecil to take these into the scope of his work. Two others, Salisbury and Rosebery, survived her, thus furnishing a justification for his grand summing up of the period. There is another reason why our author is inclined to be somewhat discursive. This is due to strong conviction and emotions, which very honourably he entertains in regard to the religious and secular problems of the Victorian and of our own age.

No one can rise from the perusal of this volume without a sense of profound admiration for Queen Victoria as well as for the series of Prime Ministers who served the State during her reign. As Lord Salisbury pointed out in his speech in the House of Lords on 25th January, 1901, on the occasion of her death: "She showed a wonderful power on the one hand of observing with the most absolute strictness the limits of her action which the Constitution draws,

and, on the other hand, of maintaining a steady and persistent influence on the action of her Ministers in the course of legislation and government." Mr. Cecil, however, does not hesitate to point out the several occasions on which she may be considered to have overstepped the bounds of constitutional propriety, in the case particularly of Gladstone. The Queen, no doubt, detested him both personally and also on account of his policy in Ireland and elsewhere, and she was no doubt influenced against him by Lord Beaconsfield. Yet no one was a more faithful and loyal servant of the Crown and the Constitution. There are times when our admiration for her good judgment and courage can be given a free rein. This was particularly the case throughout the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, when she felt convinced that "those two dreadful old men," Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, would entangle us in a war with which we had no concern. As she wrote in February, 1864, "Lord Russell knows that she will *never*, if she can prevent it, allow this country to be involved in a war in which *no English interests* are concerned." A signal instance of the delicacy and tact with which Mr. Cecil has handled the relation of Queen Victoria and her Ministers is afforded by his account of that between the Queen and Lord Melbourne. "Fatherly and filial were in fact the operative words in defining it; and neither party, we may feel sure, despite the critics, ever dreamed of or desired any other. For two idyllic years, until Albert appeared, they were both able to gratify a sentiment which neither had previously experienced—a sentiment devoid of passion, but rich in all age can ever offer to youth, or youth give back to age."

It is proper that we should quote the exact words in which Mr. Cecil defines his purpose. "It was to study the relations of the Queen with her ten Prime Ministers, their influence upon the Queen, and, most important of all, the influence of the Queen and her Prime Ministers in their collaboration on the politics and the social and intellectual climate of their day." We are enabled to trace the various interpretations which the statesmen in question placed upon their duty towards the sovereign. In the case of Melbourne, as already mentioned, there is the attitude of fatherly instruction. Palmerston and Russell, as befits their Whiggery, exhibit their independence, and even their indifference to the Crown. Lord Beaconsfield runs to the opposite extreme, and even stoops to an unctuous flattery which was perhaps taken more seriously by the Queen than by himself. Mr. Gladstone, on the other hand, according to her own account, treated her too much like a public meeting. Finally, if we may interpret Mr. Cecil's own conclusion, the most perfect Prime Ministers in this respect were Sir Robert Peel and Lord Salisbury. These two statesmen were, he considers, fundamentally of the same school, and in their relations with the Queen conducted themselves with that mixture of deference and independence which was, and is, most suitable to the theory and practice of the Constitution. It was assuredly much to the credit of Her Majesty that she responded in full to this attitude, and accorded them her loyalty and unwavering trust.

THE HON. GEORGE PEEL.

Queen Victoria and Her Prime Ministers. Eyre & Spottiswoode, 25s.

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HITLER

Mr. Bullock is to be congratulated and thanked for this biography. After working his way through its 700 odd pages, the reader feels as if he had wandered through an inferno. He cannot help admiring the self-denying energy of its author, who spent years in exploring and recounting the acts and crimes of "the most hateful character in the forefront of history since Machiavelli reduced to a code the wickedness of public men." These are the words with which

Lord Acton characterised Robespierre. But how harmless seems the French Jacobin compared to the German tyrant! The "Reign of Terror" of 1793 was abominable, but its victims are numbered in thousands, those of Hitler in millions. Robespierre, at any rate, had a certain idealism, while Hitler's principal aim, as Mr. Bullock rightly points out, was lust of power, of a power utterly personal and without any bounds, and his principal *motif* was infernal hatred. There is no reason to tone down this indictment on account of his capabilities, but Mr. Bullock is too conscientious not to emphasise and define these qualities without which his enormous successes would have been inexplicable miracles. He has mastered the complicated party struggles of the Weimar Republic, and records with a wealth of detail Hitler's astonishing rise to power in ten short years from his despicable rebuff in 1923 to his triumphant entrance into the Chancellery in 1933.

Mr. Bullock rightly emphasised that Hitler had a genius for agitation, for he is the greatest demagogue who ever appealed to the passions of the masses. He was helped by the psychical instability of the German people after the defeat of 1918, by the inflation which had destroyed the property-owning educated middle-class, by the infamous "stab-in-the-back" legend, invented by the defeated Generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg in the interest of their own glory, by the foolish and disloyal protection of the Bavarian particularists, by the weakness of the senile Reichspresident, and by the political blindness of the so-called Conservatives like Papen and Hugenberg. But his strongest asset was his absolute want of any moral scruples, which permitted him to commit every crime, every deception, every lie. That was one of his greatest helps, too, in his sensational international successes from 1933 to 1939, combined with the fact that he wanted war, while all responsible Western statesmen hated it, and considered the maintenance of peace as their highest and self-evident duty. We may laugh now about Neville Chamberlain returning from Munich with "Peace in our time." But how could an English politician, taught and used to consider his opponents more or less as gentlemen, understand a man who never dreamed of being bound by his spoken or written word, and who was angry about the Munich agreement, although it had brought him complete success, because it had deprived him of a pretext for war?

Hitler's successes gave him an overwhelming ascendancy over the German people, and made even some non-Germans consider him a great statesman. But one indispensable quality of the statesman is the ability to calculate the consequences of his acts, and here he failed catastrophically. His professed principal aim was to erect a strong united Pan-German Empire, but he left a Germany, divided for the first time since 1870 and deprived of territories which had been German since the Middle Ages. He wanted to strike down the Bolsheviks, but he made them stronger, more powerful, and more dangerous than ever before. For a century the Russians' respect for the German army had been so great that they never dared to attack, but Hitler succeeded in destroying this respect. In one aim only did he succeed—in the destruction of German Jewry. But that required only brutal cruelty. In his memorable Belsen speech, Theodor Heuss characterised the Hitler movement as the "breaking through of the biological naturalism of the *Halbbildung*." This "Halbbildung," or semi-education, allowed him to be a gross materialist without any religious faith, and nevertheless to believe in a Providence whose only function was to protect him personally. Mr. Bullock has amassed and mastered a vast material, of which the Nuremberg documents are particularly important. He writes with the scholarly detachment of the true historian, but is never afraid to express his opinion in clear and outspoken words.

DR. ERICH EYCK.

Alan Bullock: *Hitler, a Study in Tyranny*. Odhams Press, 25s.

SIR DAVID KELLY'S REMINISCENCES AND REFLECTIONS

The secret of British diplomacy is the agility with which it climbs out of pits into which it should never have fallen. In other words, it is for the *diplomat de carrière* to rectify by his adroitness, as it is for the officer by his courage and skill, the blunder and weakness resulting from the interplay between the electorate, the House of Commons and Cabinet Government; and one of the heaviest follies of diplomacy is public opinion misguided. Those who guide opinion wisely hold the reins of power. They are "the ruling few."

Sir David Kelly combines shrewdness, insight, zest, an appreciation of atmosphere, a love of freedom and a knowledge of history. He never misses *la nuance de la vérité*. So here is a book of precisely outlined facts, telling points, tasty paradoxes, and friendly sympathies from a highly successful diplomat whose special gift has been to recognise that public opinion can be guided, that through friendship and sympathy one exerts power, and that if a diplomat adds to study the seeing eye, he can learn everything, like a king or a queen. He was actually in the Foreign Office when, in the interests of strategy, Sir Maurice Peterson worked out with M. de St. Quentin of the Quai d'Orsay that essential adjustment of ticklish diplomacy which, when published to the world as the Hoare-Laval agreement, was rejected because public opinion did not understand that the Foreign Office was working against Hitler in order to preserve the strategy of the Mediterranean. Following Peterson in Egypt (as he afterwards followed him in Pera and Moscow) the author has shown more clearly just how awkward were the results, but so urbanely that a Foreign Secretary, no matter how short-sighted, could never be affronted.

Never was a greater blunder made in history than when Red Russia (now combining with Red China to control eight hundred millions) was handed the keys of both Asia and Europe. And such are the ironies of fate that Sir David, who knew as well as any what was happening, was impelled as the ultimate recognition of his success into the Moscow Embassy. But even though constrained to dwell with Mersech, *fort surveillé*, in those tents of Kedar which Sir Maurice Peterson had thankfully vacated, he found magnificent opportunities to see what was happening in them at the present moment. If he could do nothing to affect Russian opinion (except through Lady Kelly extending to Russian works of art the interest to which we owed her *Turkish Delights*), Sir David has learnt just what to put before British opinion and just how to put it. Here, in the schoolboy's phrase, is the "low-down" on Bolshevism, and no student of affairs dare ignore it, as no student of life will fail to relish the book as a whole.

On the many sidelights on contemporary controversies, one which will shake some recent contributions to history is that Chamberlain went to Hitler in 1938, at the insistent request of the French Premier, who had already decided not to fight. When we compare this evidence from a source so reliable and so distinguished as that of the last British Ambassador to Moscow with Volume V. of *Documents of Foreign Policy*, we find that the Military Attaché in Paris wired that Lindbergh had reported the German Air Force to be overwhelming and the French dared not fight. But this report is dated 24th September, 1938, which was after Chamberlain's visit to Berchtesgaden and before that to Godesberg. On September 24th Sir Eric Phipps, the Ambassador, reported "all that is best in France is against war almost at any price." But Sir David Kelly shows that these views had reached the Foreign Office on September 14th, and insists that here his excellent memory has the added support of a date. But there is no Grindelwald Pass in Switzerland, and coming back from Schuls Tarasp it would be the Fluela, or possibly the Julier, and between

the author's first and third visits to Russia were 37 years, not as he says three times 27. Chamberlain had, in fact, spoken of going to see Hitler before Daladier begged him to intercede, and by going he saved London and Paris from a worse situation than in 1939 or 1940.

ROBERT SENCOURT.

The Ruling Few. By Sir David Kelly, G.C.M.G., M.C. Hollis & Carter, 25s.

CHADWICK AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH

By a coincidence two books dealing with the hitherto somewhat neglected career of Edwin Chadwick have appeared within a short time of each other. Professor Finer's *Life and Times* covers the whole of Chadwick's long life of ninety years (1800-1890), while Mr. Lewis confines himself to the public health movement, which owed so much to his hero's enthusiasm. Both works, combining exhaustive research with vivid presentation, make important contributions of great merit to our knowledge of the subject. It is common knowledge today that the sanitary conditions formerly prevailing in towns and villages were directly responsible for much of that vast mass of human misery and epidemic disease which less scientific ages had been inclined to ascribe to the inscrutable acts of God. The Sanitary and Interment Reports of 1842 and 1843, however, which exposed the malignant evils of defective drainage, polluted and intermittent water supply, and the full horrors of the overcrowding of churchyards and burial grounds, came as a shocking revelation at the time. The moving spirit behind these epoch-making reports, with their revolutionary recommendations, was Edwin Chadwick, whose interest in the problem of the elimination of disease through good sanitation and drastic burial reform amounted to a consuming passion. Previously, he had played a highly controversial part in the administration of the Poor Law, itself also largely due to his inspiration, and this is fully expounded by Professor Finer. For his work for public health we have both authorities.

After exasperating struggles and delays, Chadwick's efforts were crowned with success when the Public Health Act was passed in 1848, but this was only the beginning of a most unhappy story, which Mr. Lewis, especially, unfolds with consummate skill. The intricate details of the Board's administrative machinery and its tense human relationships are analysed with masterly lucidity, and as each section is dovetailed into its place, it is seen to be necessary to the completed picture as a whole. That the Board of Health was Chadwick, and that Chadwick meant to be the Board of Health, was at once its great strength and its fatal weakness—its strength because of his colossal energy and mountain-moving faith, but its weakness because of the tragic limitations of his undoubtedly offensive disposition. His case was in the main so strong (but only in the main, for he was equally dogmatic in contentions that have proved both wrong and mischievous), and his opponents were tainted so often by prejudice, self-interest and privilege, that his self-righteousness and arrogance as a colleague amounted to a national disaster. Not content to be the guardian of a noble cause, he must always play the master, maddening opponents and saddening friends of his cause. The nineteenth century seems to have been peculiarly prolific in such difficult benefactors of mankind, men who failed to understand that if the object of all reform is that men may live happily together, rude and overbearing manners can be as potent a source of mental ill-health and human misery as bad sanitary conditions are of physical disease. A perfectly sanitary world, run by officials selected by competitive examination, paid strictly by results, and domineered over by the Chadwicks, Lowes, Lingens and Ayrtons might be Utopia, but it would certainly be unbearable. Both writers are too sound as historians to glaze over Chadwick's inveterate tendency to dramatise himself

as a hero in a world of fools and knaves, but their admiration of his work leads them to judge him by a more lenient standard than is applied to those who found him impossible. It is particularly hard to accept some of Professor Finer's estimates of character.

With the fall of the Board of Health Mr. Lewis brings his story to a close, but the other study takes us to the end of Chadwick's long life, to which is appended an impressive bibliography of his voluminous writings, and a chronological list of his innumerable activities. As a life of the eminent sanitary reformer it is complete and fully documented, but the picture of his "times" is far too narrow and one-sided to be taken as an adequate account of that extremely complicated and interesting age we call the nineteenth century.

DR. WINIFRED TAFFS.

Edwin Chadwick and the Public Health Movement, 1832-1854. By R. A. Lewis. Longmans, Green & Co., 24s.

The Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick. By S. E. Finer. Methuen & Co., 42s.

THE GOETHE-YEAR

The editor of this Year-book, the first four parts of which were published more than a year ago, clearly aimed at presenting as many aspects as possible of Goethe's personality. The first volume dealt with his conception of personality, his idea of "acceptance," the psychologist, the educationist, the man of action. The present volume gives in outline a new appraisal of his *Weltanschauung*. Its chapters show an identical pattern: after a short "Homage," more or less indicating what we are to expect, there follow a number of quotations (in verse and prose) which may be regarded as a musical introduction to the analytical articles dealing with a special aspect of his philosophy. In most chapters, though not all, the conclusions reached by the numerous contributors tally with what he says in his "musical" introductions. Some articles are irrelevant, and some show once more that certain problems cannot be adequately dealt with in a few pages. An important essay seems to be missing: one might have expected to find an inquiry as to how deeply Goethe has influenced his own people, or whether Nietzsche's statement that he had been an event without consequences in German history was perhaps true. Several quotations from his conversations seem to confirm that view; for instance: "When we Germans do not look beyond the compass of our surroundings, we fall into pedantic presumption." Another time he said: "If one could only teach the Germans, after the example of the English, a little less philosophy and a little more energy, less theory and more practice, a good deal of salvation would become ours." Considering German history between 1870 and 1945, one is inclined to wish—and so might Goethe if he had been able to look into the future—that the Germans had for ever remained metaphysicians and never become an "energetic" nation. During the last century they had become "*ein Volk der Richter und Henker*," as the great poet and satirist, Karl Kraus, once said, while they had been before, "*ein Volk der Dichter und Denker*," as Lord Lytton has put it. Goethe once said to Eckermann that one finds hatred of other nations "only at the lowest levels of civilisation." One very interesting article deals with the "demonic" in Goethe's personality, and how he conquered or rather integrated it, while his romantic contemporaries and, in our days, the National Socialists, realised that demonism to the limit.

After the famous passages in *Wilhelm Meister* about the three forms of awe needful to man have been quoted, we read analyses of Goethe's religion. While one contributor asserts that "for Goethe there cannot be a division of God and World, Goethe is fundamentally a pantheist," another denies that he was. Both assertions are one-sided, for he stated himself: "I, for one, with the mani-

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fold tendencies of my nature, cannot be content with one way of thinking. As a poet and artist I am a polytheist; a pantheist, however, as a scientist, and the one as decidedly as the other. If I require one God for my morality, this too has been provided for." He praised the sublime ethics of the Gospels, but it is certainly going too far to point out that his *leitmotif* was "the idea of merciful grace and love," as does the well-known philosopher, Spranger, who even tries to make him an "existentialist." A few contributors try to summarise the idea of his life and work in a single monumental sentence, Martin Buber, for instance, repeating Goethe's own statement that "the meaning and significance of his writings was the triumph of the purely human." That he was right in stating this we cannot deduce from the fact that a Mohammedan contributor to this book asserts that he was an "Oriental," and that an Indian contributor says: "There is a close affinity between our culture and the German culture as represented by Goethe." In the most interesting of all the contributions, that of the Swiss Professor Robert Faesi, we find the most comprehensive and adequate formula: "Goethe presents the last picture and symbol of man's creative power of making a cosmos out of his inner world."

DR. J. LESSER.

The Goethe-Year. An International Bi-lingual Publication in 12 parts. Edited by Dr. Wilhelm Unger. Parts V-XII. The Orpheus Publications Co.

FORMOSA

Brightly written, though with occasional lapses into journalese, Mr. Maclear Bate's book deserves to be widely read. Formosa is a country of which most British readers know very little—about as little as we knew of Korea three years ago. The book supplies us with abundant historical and economic information, and also with lively pictures of the Formosan scene. Economically Formosa depends almost entirely on sugar production; lately this has been kept going only by American aid for the purchase of fertilisers. Other potential but undeveloped economic assets are the dockyard at Keelung and the oil refinery at Kaohsiung. Strategically the island, with its nearness to South China and the Philippines, is of great importance. Its present political interest lies in the fact that Chiang Kai-shek's forces are concentrated there. The most interesting chapter in the book is the author's account of an interview with the Generalissimo—the first that he had granted to a British newspaperman for three years. The author does not come to any firm conclusions about this baffling personality. "Only in the light of history can this be done, and then he must be judged according to the lights of his people at the time in which he lived." But Mr. Bate wisely points out that, when it suited them, the Western Powers acclaimed him as a great Christian hero. "Can yesterday's hero really be the villain of today?" he pertinently asks. From Mr. Bate's portrait, Chiang impresses us as a man of great courage and resilience. He is personally honest and lives a simple life; but Mr. Bate shows that there is truth in the allegations that many of his most powerful supporters have used their positions to make private fortunes out of "graft." Nor does he conceal the fact that his power is maintained by ruthless secret police methods reminiscent of other dictatorships. His elder son, Chiang Cheng-kuo, who is in charge of these activities, studied police methods in Russia. The Nationalist forces include 25,000 "political officers." Mr. Bate gives an amusing example of how traditional Chinese courtesy softens the new toughness. "I was advised by foreign friends to leave my luggage unlocked in my rooms. This would, it was hinted, enable any 'check-up' on the contents by the hard-working secret agents to be effected without undue embarrassment or inconvenience to either them or me."

DAVID WEST.

Report from Formosa. By H. Maclear Bate. Eyre & Spottiswoode, 16s.